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Abstract
This Note argues that key escrow represents a solution to the problem of digital money laun-
dering. In addition, this Note argues that the European Commission has wrongly concluded that
key escrow should develop as a product of market forces rather than aggressive legislation, and
should align its policy with the United States, France, and Great Britain to develop a joint network
of key escrow authorities. Part I of this Note explains the operation of digital payment systems,
digital money, and cryptography. Part I also sets forth existing legal safeguards against money
laundering. Part II outlines the key escrow policies of the European Community, Great Britain,
France, and the United States. Part III analyzes the European Commission’s arguments against
implementing key escrow and suggests that these arguments have been addressed and effectively
rebutted by key escrow proposals in the United States and Great Britain. This Note concludes
that a global network of key escrow authorities would provide law enforcement with the means to
prevent digital money laundering.
NOTES
ENCRYPTED DIGITAL CASH TRANSFERS: WHY
TRADITIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROLS MAY
FAIL WITHOUT UNIFORM
CRYPTOGRAPHY REGULATIONS
Christopher D. Hoffman*
"We stand at the dawn of an age of global economic integra-
tion. Unfortunately, we are in some sense victims of our own
progress."1
INTRODUCTION
Like the Trojan Horse, which hid a deadly enemy behind its
deceptive charm, electronic payment systems 2 provide benefits
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University. This Note is dedicated to the
memory of my parents.
1. See Noble Warns of Technological Progress As Boon to Laundering, 6 MONEY LAUNDER-
ING ALERT 9 (1995) (quoting Ronald K. Noble, United States Undersecretary of the
Treasury for Enforcement).
2. See Laurie Law et al., How to Make a Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic
Cash, 46 AM. U. L. Rxv. 1131 (1997) (giving examples of electronic payment systems,
including digital checks, credit cards, debit cards, and stored value cards); Catherine
Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic Money and Beyond,
30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 671 (1997) (describing electronic checks as paper checks that are
created and cleared electronically). A stored value card, also known as a "smart card"
or "SVC" is
a wallet-size card, similar in appearance to a credit card, with a magnetic strip
or microprocessor embedded in the card. Value is loaded on the card by the
issuer based on the amount of cash tendered by the customer. The card may
be used to purchase goods or services. Value is removed from the card by the
merchant providing goods or services.
Id. See also Report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the
Group of Computer Experts of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries, Se-
curity of Electronic Money at 30 (1996) [hereinafter Basle Report on Payment and
Settlement Systems] (describing SVC as electronic purse). The term electronic purse,
commonly used to refer to SVCs, is defined as:
an IC card containing an application that stores a record of funds available to
be spent or otherwise used by the holder; the record of funds is updated as
transactions are made. Additional funds may be added to the stored balance
through a withdrawal from a bank account or by other means. Sometimes
referred to as a stored value card.
Id. The Basle Committee is,
[a] Committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the
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to consumers3 while enabling money launderers to ply their
trade with greater ease.4 Consumers using digital payment sys-
tems can transfer money in its digital form' quickly and anony-
central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of
senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. It usually meets
at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, where its permanent Secre-
tariat is located.
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Super-
vision, at n.1 (1997) [hereinafter Basle Core Principles for Banking Supervision] The
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems established the Task Force on Security
of Electronic Money which,
[p]rimarily examined consumer-oriented stored-value payment products, a
few of which have already been launched in large-scale pilot programmes in
various countries; others are expected to be widely introduced in 1996 or
1997. Through interviews with suppliers, the Task Force identified general
models of electronic money products and specific characteristics that are rele-
vant to security. The Task Force found that the logical design chosen for the
stored electronic "value", as well as the conditions under which such money
balances can be transferred to other users, provide the basic framework for
examining security measures in the various stored-value products .... The
Task Force found that various security measures have been developed to pro-
tect the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of critical data and
processes of electronic money products[, and that c]ryptography is the ...
critical safeguard for card-based systems and, indeed, the primary safeguard
for software-based systems.
Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra, at 1.
3. See DANIEL C. LYNCH & LESLIE LUNDQUIST, DIGITAL MONEY, THE NEW ERA OF
INTERNET COMMERCE 2-3 (1997) (noting benefits of digital payment systems such as in-
expensive operation and easy access to greater selection of merchants from convenient
location such as personal computer).
4. See Financial Action Task Force, 1996-1997 Report on Money Laundering Typologies
65 (visited Oct. 19, 1997) <http://www.oecd. org/fatf/fatfviii.htm#III.RECENT
TRENDS AMONG FATF MEMBERS> (also on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter 1997 FATF Report] (describing concerns raised by potential crimi-
nal use of digital payment systems); Group of Ten, Report of the Working Party on
Electronic Money, Electronic Money, Consumer Protection, Law Enforcement, Supervi-
sory and Cross Border Issues (April 1997) [hereinafter Group of Ten Report on Elec-
tronic Money] (warning nations to closely monitor development of digital payment sys-
tems for criminal activity); see also The Risks in Electronic Commerce, INTELLIGENCE NEWS-
LETrER, Feb. 27, 1997 (identifying various factors enabling criminal use of electronic
commerce including its anonymity, speed, and lack of legal oversight).
5. See Lawrence H. White, The Technology Revolution and Monetary Evolution, in THE
FUTURE OF MONEY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 15-16 (James A. Dorn, ed., 1997) (describ-
ing digital cash as spendable balance represented by string of digits in computer mem-
ory that constitutes claim on financial institution without being linked to any particular
account); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
BOARD, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 477 (Kenneth W.
Dam and Herbert S. Lin, eds., 1996) [hereinafter "CRISIS REPORT"] (comparing digital
cash to paper cash).
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mously.6 In addition, consumers can use cryptography,v a means
to encode and decode messages with a numeric value called the
key,' to secure electronic money transfers from theft and manip-
ulation.9 Having almost exclusive control of money transfers,1"
financial institutions have traditionally served as the safeguards
against money laundering by maintaining records documenting
the origin and destination of transferred funds." Because digi-
tal payment systems do not require financial institutions to oper-
ate, individuals making digital payments can disregard regula-
Digital cash is similar to paper cash in the sense that neither the paper on
which paper money is printed nor the string of bits that represents digital cash
has intrinsic value; value is conferred on a piece of paper or a particular string
of bits if, and only if, an institution is willing to accept responsibility for them.
CRISIS Report, supra, at 477.
6. See Law, supra note 2, at 1133 (describing operation of digital payment systems
on computer networks); Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note
2, at 30 (describing how electronic wallets enable individuals to conduct transfers be-
tween SVCs and transfer money from bank account onto SVC via ATM machine or
personal computer).
7. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 356 (defining cryptography as "the science
and technology of keeping information secret from unauthorized parties by using a
code . . . ."). Originally developed to protect military communications, cryptography
has recently reached worldwide popularity as the means to secure Internet transactions
and encode e-mail. LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 253.
8. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 376 (discussing operation of cryptography).
9. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 70 (noting that use of cryptography in
electronic transactions allows identification of parties, authentication of identities,
nonrepudiation of the transaction, verification of data, and privacy).
10. See ROBERT C. EFFROS, INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD xxvii-
ix (Robert C. Effros, ed., 1994) (describing two types of money transfer system: debit
transfer, where payee instructs his or her bank to collect from payor, and credit trans-
fer, where payor instructs bank to debit payor's account and credit payee's account).
11. See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994) (requiring financial institutions
conducting transactions on behalf of single individual involving US$10,000 or more in
aggregate to file Internal Revenue Service form 4789 Currency Transaction Report);
Money Laundering Control Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994) (criminalizing use of financial
institutions to structure transactions to circumvent reporting requirements); 58 Fed.
Reg. 46,014 (1993) (amending Bank Secrecy Act to impose reporting requirements on
financial institutions conducting wire transfers); United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/
15 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Illicit
Traffic or Convention] (mandating that signatory nations cooperate in producing fi-
nancial institution records documenting suspect transactions); Council of Europe Con-
vention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds From Crime,
30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) [hereinafter Council of Europe Convention] (requiring that sig-
natory nations minimize negative effect of domestic bank secrecy laws on prosecution
of money launderers); Council Directive No. 91/308, art. 3, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991)
[hereinafter Council Directive 91/308] (requiring financial institutions to keep records
of customers conducting transactions involving 15,000 ECU or more).
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tions that govern such institutions.12  Without regulatory over-
sight and with the protection of cryptography, criminals can
easily adapt digital payment systems for money laundering pur-
poses. 13 In order to prevent this, law enforcement authorities
must police digital money transfers. 4 A digital transfer encoded
with cryptography will reveal nothing about its origin or destina-
tion. 5 Preventing digital money laundering therefore hinges on
law enforcement's access to cryptographic keys."
Recognizing the potential use of cryptography to hide crimi-
nal activity, the governments of Great Britain,17 France, 18 and
12. See Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 35
(describing general model of payment system where users conduct transactions and
transfers of money electronically without need for financial institutions to initiate trans-
fers).
13. See 1997 FATF Report, supra note 4, annex 1, 3 (describing difficulty of
detecting money laundered using digital payment technology); Jeremy Platts, Proliferat-
ing Cyberbanks Threaten Money Laundering Controls, 8 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT 8 (1997)
(stressing that anonymity and easy transfer of digital money create law enforcement
concerns); Sarah Jane Hughes, "Cyberlaundering"Poses Threat to Controls, 6 MONEY LAUN-
DERING ALERT 1 (1997) (noting that numerous daily transfers of assets enabled by digi-
tal payment systems will prevent effective containment of money laundering problem).
14. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 220 (stating that development of new tele-
communications services will impose greater burden on law enforcement to intercept
and decrypt suspect transmissions).
15. See Jason Kerben, The Dilemma for Future Communication Technologies: How to
Constitutionally Dress the Crypto-Genie, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECruS 125, 129 (1997) (noting
recent study finding that, in order to decrypt message encoded with 1,024 bit key, one
would need one hundred computers with eight megabytes of memory operating at one
hundred MHz for 280,000 years); Loring Wirbel Big Bellcore Team Cracks RSA Code, ELEc-
TRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, May 2, 1994, at 1 (statihg that "[e]very 10-decimal digit
equals approximately 33 bits"); See CRIsis REPORT, supra note 5, at 388 (stating that an
attacker must attempt 256 numeric combinations in order to find fifty-six bit, seventeen
digit, cryptographic key); Gary Taubes, Small Army of Code-Breakers Conquers a 129-Digit
Giant; Team of Scientists Factors 129-Digit number used in Cryptography; Includes Related Infor-
mation, 264 ASAP 5160 (May 6, 1994) (describing how one research team cracked 425
bit key in eight months).
16. See William R. Spernow, Cybercrooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement
Will Be Unable to Cope With Threats to the Electronic Commerce System, in MONEY LAUNDERING,
ASSET FORFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIMES 14 (Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. &
Robert J. Munro, eds., 1997) (stating that encryption represents primary. reason for
increasing failure of law enforcement to prosecute Internet crime); Scott Sultzer,
Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It 63 TENN. L. REv. 143,
196 (noting that Internet banks can expand money laundering activities with impunity
if law enforcement officials have no access to encrypted data).
17. See UK Department of Trade and Industry, Public Consultation Paper on Detailed
Proposals for Legislation, Licensing of Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Serv-
ices, March 1997 (visited Sept. 3, 1997) <http://dtiinfol.dti.gov.uk/pubs/> (also on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter British DTI Public Consultation
Paper or Consultation Paper] (setting forth proposal for key escrow agency network).
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the United States19 have embraced key escrow20 as a possible so-
lution. Key escrow agencies provide law enforcement with access
to transmissions encoded with cryptography by keeping records
of all cryptographic keys in use by the public and releasing them
under judicial subpoena. 21  The Commission of the European
Communities22 ("European Commission") opposes key escrow,
18. See Law No. 96-659, 26. 7.96, art. 17 (1996) <http://www.telecom.gouv.fr/eng-
lish/activ/telecom/nloil7.htm> (also, on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
[hereinafter French Key Escrow Regulation] (setting forth proposed amendment to
French Telecommunications Act of 1996, Law No. 90-1170, 29.12.90, establishing key
escrow agencies).
19. See Bruce W. McConnell & EdwardJ. Appel, Interagency Working Group on Cryp-
tography Policy, Draft Paper: Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the
Global Information Infrastructure, May 20, 1996 (visited Sept. 3, 1997) <http://
www.isse.gmu.edu/pfarrell/nist/kmi.html> (also on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter White Paper] (setting forth Clinton Administration's propo-
sal to replace export controls on cryptography with key escrow); Statement of the Vice
President, Al Gore, Cong. Press Release, Oct. 1, 1996 (visited Sept. 3, 1997) <http://
www.epic.org/ crypto/key.escrow/clipper4_statement.html> (also on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Gore Speech] (proposing to relax export
controls in return for industry cooperation in developing key escrow system)
20. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 359 (defining escrowed encryption as "an
encryption system that enables exceptional access to encrypted data through special
data recovery keys held by a third party.").
21. See id. at 168 (stating that escrow not only provides law enforcement with ac-
cess to cryptographic keys, but also provides user services such as recovery of lost or
corrupted keys).
22. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd., 5179-Il)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATISES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987); See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw 57 (stating that European Commission func-
tions as "[European] Community's executive organ"); EC Treaty, supra, arts. 155-63,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84 (setting forth powers of Commission). The powers of the
European Commission, as set forth in Article 155 of the EC treaty, include:
-ensur[ing] that the provisions of [the EC Treaty] and the measures taken by
institutions persuant thereto are applied;
-formulat[ing] recommendations or delivering opinions on matters dealt with
in [the EC Treaty], if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers is
necessary;
-hav[ing] its own power of decision and participat[ing] in the shaping of
measures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the man-
ner provided for in [the EC Treaty];
-exercis[ing] the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementa-
tion of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id., art 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682. See DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, EURO-
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considering it an unnecessary burden on commerce that is bet-
ter left to the scrutiny of the market. 2 Proponents of key escrow
respond by arguing that economic expediency should not trump
the interests of law enforcement, and that a coordinated mul-
tinational effort to create a network of key escrow agencies
would prevent the use of cryptography for criminal purposes.2 4
This Note argues that key escrow represents a solution to
the problem of digital money laundering. In addition, this Note
argues that the European Commission has wrongly concluded
that key escrow should develop as a product of market forces
rather than aggressive legislation, and should align its policy with
the United States, France, and Great Britain to develop a joint
network of key escrow authorities. Part I of this Note explains
the operation of digital payment systems, digital money, and
PEAN COMMUNITY LAw 665 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that term "European Union" refers to
political relationship between three pillars of European Community). The Treaty on
European Union created a single Union comprised of three Communities: the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC"), the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 91992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU] amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty], as amended &y Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987)). The EEC, ECSC, and Euratom comprise the first of three
pillars that form the European Union. WYATr & DASHwOOD, supra, at 655. Identified
by the TEU, the second and third pillars are the Provisions on a Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Provisions on Co-operation in the Fields of Justice and Home Af-
fairs. TEU, supra, tits. V, VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-97 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at 729-35.
Fifteen Member States comprise the European Union today. OFFCE FOR OFFCIALL PUB-
LICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BUILDING EUROPE TOGETHER 15 (1997). The
Member States include Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Den-
mark, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Fin-
land, and Austria. Id. The European Union has also committed itself to officially dis-
cuss the future membership of Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovenia. Id.
23. See Commission of the European Communities, Ensuring Security and Trust in
Electronic Communication: Towards a European Framework for Digital Signatures and
Encryption: Communication from the Commission to the European Council, European
Parliament, and the Committee of the Regions COM (97) 503 Final at 12 [hereinafter
Communication on European Encryption Policy] (suggesting that market forces should
determine propriety of key escrow and stating that imposition of key escrow "could lead
to market obstacles and reduce the competitiveness of the European industry.").
24. See British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17, 18 (stressing need
for key escrow network international in scope); CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 11 (sug-
gesting that U.S. government work with other nations to maximize benefit of key es-
crow).
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cryptography. Part I also sets forth existing legal safeguards
against money laundering. Part II outlines the key escrow poli-
cies of the European Community, Great Britain, France, and the
United States. Part III analyzes the European Commission's ar-
guments against implementing key escrow and suggests that
these arguments have been addressed and effectively rebutted by
key escrow proposals in the United States and Great Britain.
This Note concludes that a global network of key escrow authori-
ties would provide law enforcement with the means to prevent
digital money laundering.
I. ELECTRONIC MONEY AND MONEY LA UNDERING
Unlike traditional wire transfer systems that employ finan-
cial institutions, digital payment systems enable individuals to
transfer money or conduct Internet transactions 25 on a personal
computer. 26  Commentators point out that digital money se-
cured'by cryptography enhances the utility of the Internet and
drives the expansion of electronic commerce. 27 Experts esti-
mate that more than 200 million people will use the Internet
regularly by the year 2000,28 and that electronic commerce will
amount to more than three trillion U.S. dollars by the year
2005.29 This prospective increase in electronic trade has forced
25. See LYNcH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 15 (noting that, today, consumers pay
for goods and services purchased on Internet primarily with credit cards).
26. See Rosalind L. Fisher, New Payments Technology, in THE FUTURE OF MONEY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 60-61 (James A. Dorn, ed., 1997) (describing electronic payment
system called Visa Interactive maintained by Visa and its member banks that allows cus-
tomers to conduct transactions using interactive television, home computer, or touch
tone telephone).
27. See LNcH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that "a new world order is
arising in mechanisms for value exchange among human beings[, d] igital money is the
cuneiform of a new age.").
28. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 673 (noting that today more than thirty million
people worldwide use Internet, and over thirty-five million households in United States
have personal computers).
29. Id. In 1994, Internet purchases were estimated at US$240 million. John Kava-
nagh, Purchases on the Internet Could Potentially Exceed $200bn by Year 2000, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1995, at 12 FT-IT. The Internet can support entire shopping malls, offering
everything from detailed product specifications to recorded sales pitches. A. Michael
Froomkin, Regulation and Computing and Information Technology: Flood Control on the Infor-
mation Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J. L. &
COMM. 395, 450 (1997). Notably, the Clinton Administration's Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce stresses that,
[n]o single force embodies our electronic transformation more than the evolv-
ing medium known as the Internet. One a tool reserved for scientific and
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law enforcement officials to focus on the possible use of elec-
tronic payment systems for money laundering.3 °
Criminals launder money using financial institutions and
businesses that serve to associate the funds with legitimate
sources.3 1 Law enforcement authorities detect money launder-
ing by policing financial institutions that transfer money. 2
Some commentators suggest that, because digital payment sys-
tems operate independently of financial institutions, law en-
forcement authorities should also police electronic transmis-
sions." One way to perform this task lies in the creation of key
escrow agencies34 that would maintain copies of cryptographic
academic exchange, the Internet has emerged as an appliance of every day
life, accessible from almost every point on the planet. . . . The Internet is
being used to reinvent government and reshape our lives and our communi-
ties in the process.... New models of commercial interaction are developing
as businesses and consumers participate in the electronic marketplace and
reap the resultant benefits.
President William J Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore Jr., Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce (July 1, 1997), at 1 (visited October 3, 1997) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/
WH/New/Commerce/> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [here-
inafter Framework for Global Electronic Commerce]. The Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities similarly notes that "[i] t is estimated that electronic commerce reve-
nues, both direct and indirect, on the Internet may increase to over 2 billion ECU
worldwide by the year 2000." Commission of the European Communities, A European
Initiative in Electronic Commerce: Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Re-
gions, COM (97) 157 Final (April 1997), at 4, 4 [hereinafter European Initiative in
Electronic Commerce].
30. See Graeme Browning, Cybercops and Robbers, 29 NAT.J. 590 (1997) (stating that
"[l]aw enforcement officials skilled in the emerging field of cybercrime believe the de-
velopment of E-cash means that extortion, racketeering and money laundering will be-
come virtually impossible to detect and stop.").
31. See generally Sultzer, supra note 16, at 148-51 (discussing mechanics of money
laundering, including "placement," "layering," and "integration").
32. See id. at 151-84 (discussing money laundering legislation in United States man-
dating financial institutions to maintain reports and records to facilitate investigations
or legal proceedings).
33. See, e.g., Peter Nielsen, G1O Mulls Effect of E-Cash on Policy and Fraud, REUTER
EUR. Bus. REP., July 4, 1996 (stating that "[o]ne of the concerns of central bankers is
that some smart card systems do not leave an audit trail and allow for the direct transfer
of money ... [a]nonymous transactions raise the possibility of money laundering and
illegal activities as criminals transfer money between cards across borders instead of
using suitcases"); CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 90-94 (arguing that encrypted elec-
tronic transmissions will frustrate investigative efforts unless law enforcement authori-
ties have access to their content).
34. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 167-68 (defining escrowed cryptography as
system that allows access to encrypted messages by establishing agencies called trusted
third parties to hold copies of all cryptographic keys in use by public).
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keys.35 Because encryption represents the primary means to se-
cure electronic transmissions, proponents of key escrow stress
that legal authorities must have access to cryptographic keys36 in
order to conduct timely investigations.3 7
A. Electronic Money
As early as 1200 AD, Italian merchants made payments by
adding and subtracting figures on bank balance sheets without
exchanging physical currency.3 Today, balance sheet entries ex-
ist as data in computer memory.3 9 Electronic money encom-
passes both digital representation4 ° of legal tender and elec-
tronic coins41 accepted by merchants on the Internet.4 2 Called
the cornerstone of digital money,43 cryptography prevents for-
gery and verifies the identity of parties to deter repudiation of
electronic transactions.4 4
35. See id. 170 (warning that failure to implement some form of key escrow may
result in "proliferation of products with encryption capabilities that would seriously
weaken, if not wholly negate, the authority to wiretap ... and damage intelligence
collection for national security and foreign policy reasons.").
36. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 68 (defining cryptographic key as "a
set of rules for substituting one character for another.").
37. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 91. FBI Director Louis Freeh has warned that
"unless the issue of encryption is resolved soon, criminal conversations over the tele-
phone and other communications devices will become incipherable by law enforce-
ment [and] this, as much as any issue, jeopardizes the public safety and national secur-
ity of [the United States]." Id.
38. See White, supra note 5, at 15-16 (discussing evolution of electronic fund trans-
fer systems).
39. Id.
40. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, General Counsel's Opinion No. 8,
Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40490 (1996) [hereinafter FDIC General Counsel's
Opinion No. 8] (setting forth conditions under which electronic funds underlying bal-
ance on stored value card represent deposit for purposes of deposit insurance cover-
age); see also White, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that "currency balance information, an
encoded string of digits, can be carried on a 'smart' plastic card with an implanted
microchip, or carried on a computer hard drive").
41. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 458 (describing digital coin as unit of value
identified by encrypted serial number in computer memory).
42. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 41
(1997); see LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 23-40 (describing various vendors of
digital money, including Checkfree, CyberCash, DigiCash and First Virtual).
43. See White, supra note 5, at 15-16 (defining digital money as spendable balance
represented by computer data constituting claim on financial institution without being
linked to any particular account).
44. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 67 (explaining that encryption consti-
tutes cornerstone in security and creation of digital money).
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1. Conventional Money Distinguished
Traditional fiat currency45 transferred physically or by wire
46
comprises the best known payment system.4 7 Traditionally is-
sued and regulated by banks, money is often influenced by
forces shaping the banking industry.4 8 As modern banks make
greater use of electronic fund transfer systems and expand oper-
ations into cyberspace,49 money evolves into electronic forms
such as the electronic coin ° and value stored on a Stored Value
45. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY 11 (1930) (defining fiat
money as money that only represents objective standard that comprises its value).
46. See Effros, supra note 10, at xxvii-ix (stating that wire transfer systems include
debit transfer, where payee instructs his or her bank to collect payor, and credit trans-
fer, where payor instructs bank to debit payor's account and credit payee's account).
47. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Legal and Technological Infrastructures for Electronic Payment
Systems, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
48. See id. at 15-20 (explaining development of money in context of banking).
49. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that emergence of Internet bank evi-
dences tremendous consumer appeal of electronic banking). Security First Network
Bank ("SFNB"), the first of two national banks to operate almost exclusively on the
Internet, opened on October 18, 1995. Id. Located at <http://www.sfnb.com>, SFNB
offers various types of deposit account services, including checking and savings ac-
counts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, an ATM/debit card, and a credit
card. Id. A 1996 report indicates that SFNB has attracted over 8000 customers and
amassed Over US$41 million in assets. Mickey Meece, Internet Bank's Offering of a Credit
Card Proves a Hit with Its Customers, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, 1996, at 18. The second In-
ternet Bank, Atlanta Internet Bank, opened in October of 1996. Jennifer Kingson
Bloom, A Second Bank is Launched into Cyberspace, A. BANKER, Oct 18, 1996 at 1. Lo-
cated at <http://www.atlantabank.com>, it is currently a part of Carolina First Corp., a
bank with US$1.5 billion in assets. Wilson, supra note 2, at 677. Atlanta Internet Bank
currently offers only money market, savings and checking accounts, electronic bill pay-
ment services, and ATM cards, but plans to offer loan products and brokerage services
by the end of 1997. Id. In addition to Atlanta Internet Bank and SFNB, one study has
indicated that at least 500 other banks maintain cites on the Internet. Thomas P. Var-
tanian, Many Evolutionary Factors Point One Way: The Internet, AM. BANKER, Dec. 23, 1996,
at 4A.
50, See Brian W. Smith & RamseyJ. Wilson, The Electronic Future of Cash: How Best to
Guide the Evolution of Electronic Currency Law, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1105, 1109 (1997) (not-
ing that distinction between traditional legal tender and electronic value takes on par-
ticular importance in determining whether issuers of electronic coins usurp govern-
ment's exclusive right to coin money). For example, under the Stamp Payments Act of
1862, 18 U.S.C. § 336 (1994), only the government can issue money in denominations
of less than one dollar. Commentators point out that the Act's legislative history reveals
congressional intent to prevent inflation caused by a shortage of government-issued
coins, and that electronic payment systems involve the transfer rather than issuance of
money. Id. at n.27. Because digital coins must be redeemed for their underlying value,
they resemble commercial paper rather than legal tender. See id. at 1111 (noting that
existence of multi-purpose check payment systems since 1891 and fact that digital
money digital money resembles checks indicates that issuers of digital coins do not
encroach on the government's exclusive right to coin money).
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Card ("SVC"). 5'
a. Regulated Electronic Fund Transfers
Individuals can transfer money using a personal computer
programmed with home banking software, 2 an automated teller
machine,53 or a financial institution providing wire transfer serv-
ices. 54 Article 4A of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code5 5 sets
forth rules governing wholesale electronic funds transfers.56
The United Nations57  Commission on International Trade
("UNCITRAL") 51 looked to Article 4A in drafting its Model Law
on International Credit Transfers. 9 Unlike Article 4A, which
covers money transfers in the United States, the UNCITRAL
Model Law was drafted to primarily govern international trans-
51. See generally LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 23-60 (describing various
electronic payment systems such as Checkfree, CyberCash, DigiCash, First Virtual Hold-
ings, and NetBill); Wilson, supra note 2, at 671 (describing operation of Stored Value
Cards ("SVC")).
52. See Tom Foremski, Web Browsers Beat Brick and Mortar, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996,
at 4 (discussing recent shift in consumer preference from personal teller service at local
branch to home banking via personal computer).
53. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(c) (defining automated teller machine or ATM as "an
electronic device at which a natural person may make deposits to an account by cash or
check and perform other account transactions").
54. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 3.
55. See Richard L. Field, The Electronic Future of Cash: Survey: 1996: Survey of the Year's
Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United
States, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 967, 973 (1997) (stating that forty-nine states adopted Uniform
Commercial Code by 1996).
56. U.C.C. § 4A-102 (1996). Regarding the scope of Article 4A, the official com-
ment to section 4A-104 states that
Article 4A governs a method of payment in which the person making the pay-
ment (the "originator") directly transmits an instruction to a bank either to
make payment to the person receiving payment (the "beneficiary") or to in-
struct some other bank to make payment to the beneficiary. The payment
from the originator to the beneficiary occurs when the bank that is to pay the
beneficiary becomes obligated to pay the beneficiary.
Id. § 4A-104 (official comment). Article 4A does not apply to consumer transactions
covered under federal law. Id. § 4A-108.
57. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1), 1(2) (describing United Nations as international
organization of fifty states formed to "develop friendly relations among nations," and
"to maintain international peace and security.... ."). The United Nations was formed
with the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in April of 1945. PETER R. BAEHR
& LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990s 1-3 (2nd ed. 1994).
58. See Eric E. Bergsen, A Payment Law for the World: UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Credit Transfers, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WOU.D 409 (Robert C. Effros, ed.,
1994) (noting that UNCITRAL's first session in 1968 included discussion of interna-
tional payments).
59. Id. at 416.
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fers.6 ° In addition, the UNCITRAL Model Law contains various
customer protection rules which, in the United States, are found
in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978.61 In the United
States, the 1978 Electronic Fund Transfer Act6 2 sets forth the
rights of consumers using electronic fund transfer systems."
The Act is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board's64 Regu-
lation E.65 Regulation E requires financial institutions offering
electronic fund transfer66 services to make various disclosures to
customers 67 and to furnish a receipt- after the customer initiates
a transfer.6" Regulation E also limits customers' liability for un-
authorized transfers69, provides for error resolution proce-
dures, 70 and restricts circumstances under which the institution
can authorize access to a customer's account.71
Current trends foreshadow a fundamental shift in banking
from personal service to electronic media.72 One study predicts
60. Id. at 417.
61. Id. at 417 n.31.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693(r) (1994). The Electronic Fund Transfer Act defines
electronic fund transfer as "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by
check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic ter-
minal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or
authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account." Id. § 1693(a) (6).
63. See Effros, supra note 10, at xxxi (discussing purpose and provisions of Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978).
64. See MAcEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 66-67 (describing U.S. Federal Reserve
System). Comprised of twelve Federal Reserve Banks and a seven member board of
governors, the U.S. Federal Reserve System exercises broad control over the monetary
supply and regulates bank holding companies and member banks in the Federal Re-
serve System. Id.
65. Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.
66. See id. § 205.3(b) (defining electronic fund transfer as "any transfer of funds
that is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic tape
for purpose- of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to debit or
credit an account.").
67. Id. § 205.7(b). Regulation E requires financial institutions to disclose the ex-
tent of the customer's liability for unauthorized electronic transfers and information
about fees, procedure to stop payment and the financial institution's liability for failure
to comply with a stop order, confidentiality of the customer's account information, and
error resolution procedures. Id.
68. Id. § 205.9(a).
'69. Id. § 205.6(b).
70. Id. § 205.11 (b). The customer initiates the error resolution procedures by giv-
ing oral or written notice to the financial institution no later than 60 days after the
institution sends the statement on which the alleged error first appears. Id.
71. Id. § 205.5(a).
72. See, e.g., Debt Collection and Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321-374 (mandating that all federal agencies make electronic payments to
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that home banking in the United States will increase from about
700,000 users in 1995 to more than five million, or seventy-five
percent of all U.S. homes, by the year 2000. 7' Recognizing the
significance of such statistics, banks increasingly seek to form al-
liances with software and computer firms.7 1 With a ten-to-one
cost ratio of accepting an over-the-counter deposit versus a direct
deposit, many banks look to electronic transactions as a means
to reduce costs.7 5 Industry analysts have noted that banks which
fail to recognize the importance of alternative delivery systems
may suffer significant competitive detriment.7
6
b. Wire Transfer Systems
Traditional payment systems facilitate money transfers using
a network of government-regulated financial institutions. 77 Elec-
tronic transfer systems 78 in the United States include the Federal
Reserve Wire Network 79 ("FedWire"), Clearing House Interbank
Payment System 8 ° ("CHIPS"), and the Society for Worldwide In-
individuals who apply for "federal benefit programs, begin employment with a federal
agency, apply for retirement benefits, enter into a contract or purchase order with the
federal government or file or renew a grant application" beginning in January, 1999).
The Department of Treasury is currently considering a proposal to implement this law
by issuing federal benefits on SVCs. Wilson, supra note 2, at 687.
73. See Foremski, supra note 52, at 4 (citing recent study conducted by U.S. market-
ing firm Jupiter Communications).
74. See id. (noting that Microsoft chairman Bill Gates predicted that "every bank
will choose to have its own Internet presence.").
75. See White, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that electronic fund transfers "lower the
cost of wiring money from $20 to 2 cents or less per transaction.").
76. See id. (stating that "U]ust as the dinosaurs either evolved into different ani-
mals or became extinct, banks will either quickly evolve into new organizations or be-
come extinct [and the] test for banks' adaptability will be what they do with their
branch networks."); see also Judge W. Fowler, The Branch is Dead!, A.B.A. BANKING J.,
Apr., 1995, at 40 (stating that "[ilf you turned every branch into a 7-11 store, the reve-
nues generated would be in excess of ten times those generated by a typical bank
branch.").
77. Bruce J. Summers, The Payment System in a Market Economy, in THE PAYMENT
SYSTEM: DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 3-4 (Bruce J. Summers, ed., 1994).
78. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Money Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the New
Regulations Take Effect Will They Help?, 14 Dira J. INT'L L. 413, 422 (1996) (noting that
110 million wire transfers in 1995 moved around US$474 trillion).
79. See Effros, supra note 10, at xxxii (noting that rules governing FedWire trans-
fers are set forth in Subpart B of the Federal Reserve's Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210).
80. See id. (describing Clearing House Interbank Payment System ("CHIPS") as
communications network and clearing facility that handles domestic and international
funds transfers).
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terbank Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFT") system. 81 Op-
erated by the twelve U.S. Federal Reserve Banks,82 FedWire con-
nects U.S. government agencies, Federal Reserve member bank-
ing institutions and their customers, and the Federal Reserve
Banks. 83 CHIPS functions as the United States' primary interna-
tional electronic funds transfer system.84 It is comprised of 140
international and domestic financial institutions. 5 The Comp-
troller of the Currency,86 the Federal Reserve System, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 7 regulate CHIPS.88
SWIFT mainly functions as an international communications sys-
tem, facilitating FedWire and CHIPS transfers by transmitting fi-
nancial information such as payment instructions and state-
ments.89
Electronic payment systems in other countries include the
French SAGITTAIRE,9 °  the Italian SETIF,9  the Japanese
81. See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 424 (noting that Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication ("SWIFr") also works in conjunction with FedWire and
CHIPS systems). SWIFT is owned and operated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications S.C., a Belgian cooperative society comprised of 1500
international financial institutions. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 423.
82. See MAcEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 66-67 (stating that Federal Reserve, com-
prised of 12 Federal Reserve Banks and seven-member board of governors, controls
money supply and oversees U.S. bank holding companies and Federal Reserve member
banks).
83. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 422.
84. Effros, supra note 10, at xxxii. See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 423 (noting that
CHIPS transfers in 1990 amounted to approximately US$222 trillion).
85. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 423.
86. See MAcEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 67 (describing Comptroller of the Cur-
rency). Housed within the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency charters and supervises national banks. Id.
87. See id. (describing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). The Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") provides federal deposit insurance to national
banks, state-chartered commercial banks, thrifts, savings banks, and savings and loans.
Id. The FDIC also retains regulatory authority over the banks which it insures and acts
as receiver in the event of their failure. Id. at 68.
88. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 423.
89. Id. at 424; see Samuel Newman, Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecom-
munication (SWIFT), in PAYMENT SVSTIEMS OF THE WORLD 381 (Robert C. Effros, ed.,
1994) (noting that SWIFT grew from fifteen member countries and 239 banks in 1973
to ninety-six member countries and 3903 banks in 1992).
90. Michael Perdrix, France, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 148, 155 (Robert
C. Effros ed., 1994). The acronym SAGITTAIRE stands for "Systtme Automatique de
Gestion lnt~gre par Talttransmission de Transactions avec Imputation de R~glemens
'Etranger.'" Id.
91. Lucio Cerenza, Italy, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 201 (Robert C. Ef-
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Gaitame-yen, 92 the British CHAPS,93 and the Swiss SIC94 systems.
The SAGITTAIRE system exclusively controls international
transfers of French francs.95 In 1990, SAGITTAIRE processed
2,448,060 electronic messages representing 35,393 billion
francs.96 SETIF was created in 1980 to streamline and organize
the Italian interbank funds transfer system.97 The Foreign Ex-
change Yen Settlement System, or Gaitame-yen has been de-
scribed as the Japanese version of CHIPS.9" The system settles
yen transfers arising from international payments and foreign
exchange transactions.99 CHAPS, an acronym for the Clearing
House Automated Payment System, provides same-day credit
transfers and settlement for payments of 5,000 British pounds
and above.100 Rather than use a central disbursement facility,
each CHAPS member uses a personal computer called the
CHAPS Gateway to send and receive payment messages.101 SIC,
or Swiss Interbank Clearing, handles interbank payments be-
tween Swiss banks.102 The volume of SIC payments on an aver-
age day in 1992 totaled approximately 131 billion Swiss francs
and 253,000 interbank payments.10 3
2. Digital Money
Economic success of SVCs and digital coins will be deter-
mined to a great extent by industry, governments, regulatory
agencies, and consumers.10 4 Industry, comprised of multina-
fros ed., 1994). The Acronym SETIF stands for "Servizio elettronico di transfefimento
inerbancario di fondi." Id.
92. Eikichi Saito, Japan, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 222 (Robert C. Effros
ed., 1994).
93. Anthony Beaves, United Kingdom, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 356
(Robert C. Effros, ed., 1994).
94. Martin Hess, Switzerland, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 318 (Robert C.
Effros ed., 1994).
95. Perdrix, supra note 90, at 148.
96. Id.
97. Cerenza, supra note 91, at 201.
98. Saito, supra note 92, at 222.
99. Id. at 223.
100. Beaves, supra note 93.
101. Id. at 357.
102. Hess, supra note 94, at 316.
103. Id. at 318.
104. Felix Stalder, Electronic Money: Preparing the Stage, at 8, 9. (visited Sept. 1,
1997) <http.www.fis.utoronto.ca /-stalder/html/e-cashl .html#Electronic> (also on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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tional banking corporations and computer manufacturers, plays
a key role in the development digital payment systems by gener-
ating an infrastructure to support digital cash transactions."'
Governments10 6 and regulatory agencies determine the legal en-
vironment in which electronic money systems will operate. 0 7
The users of electronic money, both customers and merchants,
influence its technical character indirectly by choosing one pay-
ment system over another.
10 8
a. Stored Value Cards
SVCs, also known as smart cards, hold a prepaid amount of
funds that consumers can access by inserting the card into a de-
105. Id. at 8.
106. See e.g., William J. Clinton, Office of the Press Secretay, Presidential Directive, Mem-
orandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, (July 1, 1997) (visited Oct.
3,1997) <http://www. whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/> (also on file with the
Fordham International LawJournal) [hereinafter Clinton Administration Directive] (artic-
ulating Clinton Administration's policy on electronic commerce). On July 1, 1997, the
Clinton Administration issued a Presidential Directive entitled Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. In the Presidential Directive, President
Clinton urges the United States to cooperate with non-U.S. governments and the pri-
vate sector to facilitate the development of electronic payment systems:
I direct the U.S. Trade Representative to work with foreign governments to
monitor newly developing experiments in electronic payment systems; to op-
pose attempts by governments to establish inflexible and highly prescriptive
regulations and rules that might inhibit the development of new systems for
electronic payment; and as electronic payment systems develop, to work
closely with the private sector in order to keep apprised about policy develop-
ment and ensure that governmental activities flexibly accommodate the needs
of the emerging marketplace.
Id. The Commission of the European Communities expressed similar sentiments:
The aim of this initiative is to encourage the vigorous growth of electronic
commerce in Europe.
Foster a favourable business environment for electronic commerce by promot-
ing adequate skills, and by making consumers and industry aware of the op-
portunities offered by electronic commerce. This will be realized through
training, information and demonstration projects; by exploiting synergies be-
tween government and industries ....
Work towards global consensus from a common European position to ensure
effective participation in current international cooperation and negotiations
European Initiative In Electronic Commerce, supra note 29, COM (97) 157 Final, at 1-2,
1-4.
107. Stalder, supra note 104, at 8.
108. Id.
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vice called the point of sale terminal.109 Merchants can transfer
the funds accumulated at the terminal to a bank account by tele-
phone. 110 One type of stored value card, the magnetic-stripe
card,1 1 can be used at terminals mounted on photocopiers or
laundry machines.' 12 Commuters in New York, San Francisco,
and Washington D.C. can use magnetic-stripe cards to pay mass
transit fares."13 In Europe, the cards are adopted for use at pub-
lic telephones." 4 Unlike magnetic-stripe cards, SVCs contain a
microprocessor chip which stores and computes funds. 1 5 Indi-
viduals can download money from a bank account directly onto
the SVC and transfer the proceeds to other SVCs using an elec-
tronic wallet, a device similar to a point of sale terminal adopted
for use in person-to-person SVC transfers.1 16 Already introduced
in Europe and Asia, electronic wallets that operate on computer
hard drives allow individuals to transfer money via modem any-
where in the world." 7
Stored value cards can be implemented in a number of dif-
ferent ways118 which generally differ in the treatment of funds
underlying the electronic value on the SVC chip. 19 The U.S.
109. Walter A. Effross, Putting the Cards Before the Purse? Distinctions, Differences, and
Dilemmas in the Regulation of Stored Value Card Systems, 65 UMKC L. REv. 319, 323 (1997);
see Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the Consumer: The Need for Regulation 46 AM.
U.L. REv. 1027, 1031 (1997) (stating that SVCs look similar to ATM or credit cards
because they are used in traditional ATM terminals).
110. Id.
111. See Smith & Wilson, supra note 50, at 1106 (stating that magnetic stripe cards
provide limited read-only data in magnetic form).
112. See id. (discussing versatility of SVCs).
113. See Effros, supra note 109, at 326 (noting everyday use of SVCs).
114. Id. at 326 n.26; see alsoRussel Mitchell, The Smart Money is on Smart Cards, Bus.
WK., Aug 14, 1995 at 68 (noting that nearly 33 million smart cards were issued in Eu-
rope and Asia by end of 1995).
115. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 6.
116. See id. at 30 (defining electronic wallet as "a computer device used in some
electronic money systems which can contain an IC card or in which IC cards can be
inserted and which may perform more functions than an IC card."). The term elec-
tronic wallet could also encompass the smart card itself. Froomkin, supra note 29, at
465 (noting that "[a] n electronic wallet is a smart card with a microprocessor on it. The
wallet interacts with specifically designed card readers, somewhat like bank cards are
used in Automatic Teller Machines.").
117. Effros, supra note 109, at 326 n.21. Law, supra note 2, at 1133.
118. See Budnitz, supra note 109, at 1032 (warning that numerous ways of imple-
menting SVCs could prevent consumers from making fully informed choices about
which SVC systems to use and suggesting that regulators require SVC issuers to disclose
pertinent information to eliminate any confusion).
119. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No. 8, supra note 40, at 40,490.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation separates stored value
card systems into one of four types based on this distinction.
121
In addition to the distribution of funds underlying the electronic
value, SVCs also differ in the degree of contact with a central
clearing facilityl 21 present during the transaction. 122 In the sys-
120. Id. In the Bank-Primary Customer Account System, funds underlying the SVC
remain in the customer's account until a payee contacts the bank to make a claim. Id.
at 40,493. This system operates similarly to a debit card, although funds are debited
from a microchip embedded in the SVC rather. than directly from the customer's ac-
count. Id. at 40,490. In the Bank Primary-Reserve Systems, value is downloaded onto a
customer's SVC and the corresponding funds withdrawn from the customer's account
and placed into a reserve account for eventual transfer to payees. Id. See Gary W.
Lorenz, Electronic Stored Value Payment Systems, Market Position and Regulatory Issues 46 AM.
U.L. REv. 1177, 1183 (1997) (warning that, because financial institutions have no way of
ascertaining total amount of value outstanding on all SVCs, successful fraud that de-
pletes funds in reserve account may not come to light until entire system becomes insol-
vent). In the Bank Secondary-Advance Systems, a third party creates electronic value
and distributes it to depository institutions. FDIC General Counsel's Opinion No., 8.,
supra note 40, at 40,490. As customers obtain the electronic value, the depository insti-
tution pays the funds to the issuer, who pays merchants and other payees as they re-
deem the electronic value for hard currency. Id. In the Bank Secondary-Pre-Acquisi-
tion System, a depository institution purchases electronic value from a third party and
then exchanges it for funds with its customers. Id.
121. Federal Payments Made Through Financial Institutions by the Automated
Clearing House Method, 50 Fed. Reg. 2405 (1987) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 210). The
term clearing house means "a payment mechanism through which participating institu-
tions exchange funds electronically." Id. In the United States, the rule making body
for commercial Automated Clearing House transactions is the National Automated
Clearing House Association ("NACHA"). Federal Government Participation in the Au-
tomated Clearing House, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,112, 50,118 (1994) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 210) (proposed Sept. 30, 1994).
122. Electronic Fund Transfers, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 (1996) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposed May 2, 1996). On Thursday, May 2, 1996, the Federal Reserve
Board published a proposed amendment to its Regulation E, which implements the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA"). Id. The EFTA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693
(1994), provides a basic framework sets forth the rights and responsibilities of parties
participating in electronic fund transfer systems. Id. Through Regulation E, the Fed-
eral Reserve exercises its authority to enact regulations implementing the EFTA. Id.
The EFTA and Regulation E apply to transactions involving ATM cards, POS (point of
sale) terminals, automated clearinghouses, telephone bill-payment systems, and home
banking programs. Id. They prescribe restrictions on unsolicited ATM card issuance,
documentation and disclosure requirements, limitations on consumer liability for un-
authorized transactions, procedures for error resolution, and certain rights related to
preauthorized electronic fund transfers. Id. Although the amendment focuses primar-
ily on applying Regulation E requirements to emerging banking technologies, the
Board also spent considerable effort at outlining three specific electronic stored pay-
ment systems. Id. at 19,699-702. Coverage of SVCs under the EFTA and Regulation E
depends on whether an SVC transaction involves an electronic transfer from the cus-
tomer's account. Id. The Board defines an electronic fund transfer as "a transfer of
funds initiated through electronic means . . . that results in a debit or credit to an
1998] ENCRYPTED DIGITAL CASH TRANSFERS
tem which the Federal Reserve Board'2 3 calls off-line 124 account-
able, both the SVC chip and a central data facility record the
available balance. 125 Parties do not contact the central database
in order to consummate an electronic transaction, and transac-
tion data is transmitted to the database only periodically. 26 In
the off-line unaccountable stored value system, the transaction
remains solely on the SVC chip.' 27 After a merchant debits elec-
tronic value from an SVC, it remains on the merchant's database
for a short time before transmission to the financial institution
where the merchant can redeem the value for hard currency. 28
In on-line systems, a central data facility alone records the avail-
able balance and updates the record after each transaction. 29
Stored value cards operating on-line differ from traditional debit
cards only in that the value associated with the card is limited to
the amount that the cardholder has chosen to make available,
and is only accessible through the card itself.'3 0
account". Id. The Board defines account to mean "a demand deposit, savings, or other
asset account - as described in the regulations of the Board - that is established primarily
for personal, checking, and other deposit accounts [and] . . . accounts established by
government agencies under electronic benefit transfer (EBT) programs .... Id. at
19,698.
123. See MAcEY & MILLER, supra note 42, at 66 (stating that Federal Reserve Board,
along with 12 Federal Reserve member banks, comprise Federal Reserve system which
oversees bank holding companies and Federal Reserve member banks in United
States).
124. 61 Fed. Reg. at 19,698. The Federal Reserve Board defines off-line systems as
operating,
with transaction approval and data retention occurring only at the merchant
level [where t] he balance of available funds may be stored only on the card
itself as transactions occur, and transactions neither require nor receive au-
thorization from a central database.
Id.
125. Id. at 19,699 (noting that bank could serve as locus of central data facility).
126. See id. (concluding that, because this system parallels debit card transactions
and necessarily involves bank account, it falls under scope of Regulation E). Finding,
however, that an unrestricted application of Regulation E requirements to these systems
could potentially inhibit their development, the Board concluded that only a limited
application would suffice. Id. at 19,699-701.
127. Id. at 19,699-701.
128. See id. at 19,701 (concluding that, since these systems lack centrally-operated
database, they do not function like accounts and should not fall under Regulation E).
129. General Counsel's Opinion No. 8, supra note 40, at 40,490.
130. See id. at 19,699-702 (concluding that these systems fall under Regulation E
requirements since they meet definition of consumer asset account). The Board also
determined that compliance with Regulation E with only a few exceptions should not
pose too great a burden on these systems since they already operate on-line. Id. See also
Lorenz, supra note 120, at 1180 (stating that "[tihe crucial difference between on-line
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b. Digital Coins
A digital coin is a unit of value identified by an encrypted
serial number1. 1 and stored on a computer's hard drive 112 or a
stored value card.13 3 After a consumer transmits the coin to a
merchant, the merchant redeems it for hard currency from the
issuer.1 34 The issuer can verify the coin's validity by checking its
serial number.1 3 5
The Basle Committee1 36 identifies two models of electronic
coin payment systems.13 7 In Basle's single-issuer model,138 an is-
suer creates and distributes electronic coins to participating in-
stitutions, usually banks.' 39 The participating institutions then
issue the electronic coins to their customers by loading them
onto SVCs or computer hard drives. 140 As the customers redeem
and off-line systems is that copying a card in an on-line system yields only an additional
access device to a single store of funds, while in an off-line system, additional funds- are
created fraudulently by duplication.").
131. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 458 (describing role of encrypted serial
number as preventive measure against forgery).
132. See Smith & Wilson, supra note 50, at 1,107 (noting that electronic coins are
generally downloaded to software for use as payment in Internet transactions).
133. Froomkin, supra note 29, at 466-67.
134. See id. at 462 (discussing on-line and off-line clearing).
135. See id. at 457 (noting structure of digital coin as serial number issued by bank
and encrypted with bank's cryptographic key).
136. Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, supra note 2, at n.1.
The Basle Committee is,
[a] Committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the
central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of
senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. It usually meets
at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, where its permanent Secre-
tariat is located.
Id.
137. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 34-37.
Each model incorporates three general levels. Id. at 34. In the clearing and settlement
domain, financial institutions, clearing houses and the central bank settle electronic
transfers. Id. Electronic value is issued and acquired by consumers in the issuing/
acquiring/operating domain. Id. The actual transactions between users take place in
the retail domain. Id.
138. Id. at 35.
139. See Wilson, supra note 2, at 702 (noting that, in United States, federal banking
regulators have indicated that issuers of electronic value do not fall under definition of
banks, and thus are exempt from federal banking- regulations, giving rise to question
whether and by what agency non-bank entities providing bank-like services should be
regulated).
140. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 35; see, e.g.,
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the coins for goods and services, merchants deposit them with
their banks, other participating institutions.141 These banks, in
turn, claim the monetary value from the issuer, or system opera-
tor.142 Consumers in this model can also transfer electronic
coins between themselves using electronic wallets."4
The role of the system operator differs in the multiple-issuer
model. 14 In this system, a number of different issuers distribute
electronic coins to consumers. 145 Merchants who accepted the
coins as payment deposit them with other issuers, who then con-
tact the system operator. 146 The system operator consolidates
the claims and transmits relevant information to the issuers. 147
. In addition to their different treatment of underlying funds,
electronic coin payment systems operate either on-line148 or Off-
line.1 49 In order to conduct a transaction in an on-line system,
LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 26 (describing operation of CyberCash). A con-
sumer using CyberCash must deposit money into a bank account especially designated
for use as payment for Internet purchases. Id. As the consumer spends CyberCash
funds online, CyberCash debits corresponding amounts of money from the designated
account. Id.
141. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 35.
142. Id. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 111 (describing issuance of digi-
tal coin where consumer uses computer to generate random serial number and trans-
mits it to bank which denotes value to serial number, debits appropriate sum from
consumer's account, encrypts number and value with its cryptographic key, and trans-
mits it back to consumer). After the consumer spends the digital coin, the merchant
that accepted it as payment will transmit it back to the bank, which credits the
merchant's account in the amount of the coin. Id. at 112.
143. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 35.
144. Id. at 36-37.
145. Id. See LYNCH.& LUNDQUtIST, supra note 3, at 24 (stating that digital coin sys-
tems fall into either traveler's check model in which coins are generally accepted by
merchants and cleared by issuer, and localized model, which operates similarly to store
coupon that is accepted only at specific location determined by issuer).
146. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 35.
147. Id. see LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 29 (describing operation of Digi-
Cash as typical multiple-issuer system, where any number of banks can issue DigiCash
coins). Internet consumers wishing to use DigiCash coins can purchase them through
a bank or an ATM machine. Id. DigiCash delivers the coins via e-mail in the form of
encrypted sixty-four bit numbers, each corresponding to a specified amount of money.
Id.
148. See Stalder, supra note 104, at 8 (defining on-line as involving "a need to inter-
act with a bank or another 'trusted third party' (via modem or network) to conduct a
transaction.").
149. See id. (defining off-line as "a transaction [that] can be conducted without
having to involve the bank directly."); LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 109 (stating
that ideal digital money system should include off-line clearing since it allows
merchants to accept payment without depending on contact with central data facility).
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parties must contact the issuer of the coin via modem or net-
work.15 The issuer then checks whether the proffered has not
been spent more than once.1 51 Because every on-line transac-
tion involves this process, it generally offers more protection for
the recipients and issuers of electronic coins from theft and
fraud than off-line systems.' 52 Transactions off-line generally do
not involve contact with a bank or the issuer, and thus rely on
other safeguards.' 53 These may include securing the SVC from
tampering or reverse engineering.15 4  Cryptography constitutes
the primary safeguard of digital cash used off-line.' 55 Because
off-line systems do not involve the additional step of contacting
an issuer and performing a fraud check, they are generally much
cheaper to implement than on-line systems.
156
B. Securing Electronic Money: Cryptography
Cryptography existed centuries ago.'5 7 Julius Caesar, for ex-
ample, used cryptography to send secret messages to his gener-
als. 8 The system he used, now called the Caesar Cipher,159 as-
signs a number to each letter in the alphabet, transcribes a
message into corresponding numbers, and then adds the Cipher
to each number in every word. 60 In the 1920s, encryption took
150. Stalder, supra note 104, at 19-20.
151. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 463 (describing how on-line clearing prevents
double spending by allowing banks to check coin proferred by payor against master list
of spent coins).
152. See id. at 462 (stating that "[p]reventing double-spending is relatively simple
for an on-line clearing system; preventing [a criminal] from cheating a system that re-
lies on off-line clearing is more difficult.").
153. See Stalder, supra note 104, at 8 (noting that methods of safeguarding off-line
digital money include hardware approach which involves using tamper-proof SVC chips
and software approach which utilizes cryptography); Lorenz, supra note 120, at 1183
(citing Mondex as example of completely off-line digital payment system).
154. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 14. Re-
verse engineering involves dissecting an SVC to determine how to construct a duplicate.
Id.
155. See id. at 14-17 and 57-64 (describing various benefits of using cryptography to
safeguard digital money and electronic payment systems).
156. Froomkin, supra note 29, at 463.
157. Kerben, supra note 15, at 125.
158. Id.
159. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 250 (referring to Caesar Cipher sys-
tem as substitution cipher).
160. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 52; see LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note , at
250 (describing ROT13 system that operates similarly by rotating each letter 13 places
so that a is replaced by n, b by o, etc.).
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place with the aid of machines which mechanically substituted a
cipher for each letter in the message.1 6 1 The most famous of
these machines was the German enigma machine used by the
Nazis to encrypt secret messages during World War 11.162 Cryp-
tography did not rest on a firm mathematical foundation until
1949, when Claude Shannon developed the precursor of sym-
metric cryptography. 16 3 Today, cryptography exists in two pri-
mary forms, symmetric and asymmetric. 164 Whereas symmetric
cryptography employs the same key to encrypt and decrypt a
message, a message encrypted with an asymmetric key can only
be decrypted with a distinct, private key.'65
During the early development of cryptography, computing
and communications were expensive and rare. 166 As informa-
tion technology today develops on a global scale, the concomi-
tant shared infrastructure and interdependence among com-
puter-based systems create new risks.167 For example, in 1994 an
international group of criminals penetrated Citicorp's comput-
erized electronic transfer system and moved approximately
US$12 million 16  to other private accounts before being
caught. 69 The robbery1 70 starkly demonstrated the need for
161. LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 253-54.
162. Id.
163. CRISIS REPoRT, supra note 5, at 364.
164. See id. at 375-76 (explaining encryption process in both symmetric and asym-
metric systems); LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 72-86 (comparing security of-
fered by symmetric and asymmetric cryptography and concluding that latter represents
safer alternative).
165. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 75 (stating that "[iln contrast to
[symmetric cryptography], the concept of [asymmetric cryptography] is based on the
notion that cryptographic keys can come in pairs, and that one key cannot be derived
from the other."); CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 375 (stating that "[iln symmetric
cryptography, the encryption key is the same as the decryption key; thus, message pri-
vacy depends on the key being secret.").
166. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
167. Id. at 22; see id. at 33 (noting that two former directors of DGSE, French
intelligence service, stated that collecting economic information was top DGSE priority
and that former DGSE Director Pierre Marion stated that he had initiated espionage
program targeting U.S. businesses in order to keep French businesses internationally
competitive).
168. See id. (noting that electronic transfer systems allow thieves to transfer far
greater amounts of money than could be physically taken away during stick up rob-
bery).
169. William Carley & Timothy O'Brien, Cyber Caper: How Citicorp System Was
Raided and Funds Moved Around World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1995 at Al.
170. See CRISIS RPORT, supra note 5, at n.21 (noting that World Wide Web offers
ideal environment for stealing data through Trojan Horse ("TH") programs that are
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data protection 171 in electronic commerce. 172 By ensuring confi-
dentiality, authenticity, and integrity of devices, cryptography
serves as the primary safeguard of electronic money and all
software-based systems. 17 3 Because cryptography can emasculate
passed into workstation, obtain information, and periodically transmit it to TH origina-
tor).
171. Council Directive No. 95/46, O.J. L 281/31 (1995) [hereinafter Data Protec-
tion Directive]. Protection of personal data has recently been an important topic of
debate in the international community. In its Directive of October 24, 1995, the Euro-
pean Parliament and Council set forth guidelines ensuring that processing of personal
data is accurate, up-to-date, relevant, and not excessive. Id. National laws under the
Data Protection Directive must also permit individuals to erase or block the processing
of incomplete or inaccurate data. Id. art. 12, OJ. L 281/31 at 42 (1995). In addition,
each member state must establish an independent public authority to supervise the
protection of personal data. Id. art. 28, O.J. L 281/31 at 47 (1995). Most importantly,
the Data Protection Directive prohibits data transfers to countries found to offer inade-
quate data protection. Id. art. 25, OJ. L 281/31 at 45. Article 25 states:
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing
after transfer must take place only if... the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection,
4. Where the Commission finds.., that a third country does not ensure an
adequate level of protection within the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article,
Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of
data of the same type to the third country in question.
Id. See Fred H. Cate, Symposium: Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive:
The Challenge for the United States: The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and
the Public Interest, 80 IowA L. REV. 431, 437 (1995) (stating that Data Protection Directive
presents significant challenge to United States, which does not have equivalent data
protection infrastructure). Britain was the first to act under Article 25 by prohibiting
the sale of a British mailing list to a United States direct mail organization. Id. at 438.
Many believe, however, that the Data Protection Directive is simply another European
attempt at threatening the U.S. dominance of the world information economy. Id. at
440.
172. CRISIS RPORT, supra note 5, at 28-29. The CRISIS REPORT notes that U.S.
firms increasingly operate in a global environment as tariffs among developed countries
have been reduced by more than two thirds to around four percent and tarries among
developing countries average 12.3% percent. Id. This expansion into the global mar-
ketplace has resulted in a greater dependence on the outside world. Id. More than a
quarter of the U.S. GDP, for example, is now accounted for by trade in goods, services
and returns on foreign investment. Id. In addition, this trend has resulted in the enor-
mous recent growth of transnational corporations which operate across national bor-
ders. Id. There are around 300 such corporations based in the United States and al-
most 15,000 foreign affiliates. Id.
173. Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 1. Cryptog-
raphy can help to
[e]nsure the integrity of data (i.e., that data retrieved or received are identical
to data originally stored or sent), to authenticate specific parties (i.e., that the
purported sender or author of a message is indeed its real sender or author),
1998] ENCRYPTED DIGITAL CASH TRANSFERS 823
law enforcement efforts to police suspect electronic transmis-
sions, commentators have proposed creating key escrow 174 au-
thorities to maintain copies of cryptographic keys that can be
subpoenaed during investigations. 17
1. Symmetric Cryptography
Cryptography begins with a written message composed, for
example, by Party A to be sent to Party B.' 7 6 All letters in the
message can be replaced by numbers. 177 Party A uses an encryp-
tion algorithm, a series of mathematical steps,178 to scramble the
written message according to the numeric representation of let-
ters in the message. 179 The algorithm can be simple addition
where A adds one to each number representing a letter in the
message.'8 ° Thus A becomes B, B becomes C .... Y becomes Z, Z
becomes space, space becomes comma, comma becomes period,
and so on.'8 ' When B receives the message, B will need to know
the decryption algorithm, subtraction in this case, and the corre-
sponding key, which here is one. a1 2 The decryption algorithm
to facilitate nonrepudiation, and to preserve the confidentiality of information
that may have come improperly into the possession of unauthorized parties.
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 365; see LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 70-72
(describing role of cryptography in digital payment systems).
174. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 81 (explaining escrow agents as parties
that hold copies of cryptographic keys for needs of government and corporate users).
175. See id. at 170 (stating that taking no 'action to establish key escrow could ne-
gate government's authority to wiretap and collect intelligence for national security and
foreign policy reasons).
176. See id. at 374 (setting forth components of encryption process).
177. Id.
178. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 275 (defining algorithm as "set of
steps for carrying out a calculation, a procedure or process usually carried out on a
computer.").
179. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 374.
180. Id.
181. Id. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 251-53 (discussing various ci-
phers.
182. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 374; Steven Levy, Wisecrackers, WIRED, Mar.
1996, at 128. The key generation method may reveal valuable hints for guessing the
actual key, and thus should be kept secret. Id. In late 1995, for example, David Wagner
and Ian Goldberg, two graduate students at Berkely, cracked encryption used by Net-
scape by analyzing its random key-generator. Id. Because computers are engineered to
work in precisely the same manner each time they execute a program, random key
generators begin with a seed, a random number which ensures a lack of predictability.
Id. Methods of choosing the seed include using the position of the mouse or any statis-
tical data. Id. As Wagner and Goldberg found, Netscape chose its seeds by using the
time of day and two fifteen bit Process Ids. Id. By choosing a specific time and then
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and key will enable B to return the message to its original form
by subtracting one from the numbers in the message and then
translating the numbers back into letters, revealing the plaintext
message written by A. 8 ' This simple encryption method is com-
monly called symmetric, secret key, or private key cryptogra-
phy.184 An example of a symmetric algorithm is the Data En-
cryption Standard ("DES") adopted by the United States Federal
Government in 1977.185 This standard uses fifty-six bit keys."8 6
Parties using symmetric encryption must face two inherent se-
curity weaknesses.18 7 First, both sender and recipient must trust
each other not to reveal the key to third parties.18 Second, be-
cause the key must somehow be transmitted from sender to re-
cipient, it is vulnerable to interception by a third party.'
2. Asymmetric Cryptography
Weaknesses of symmetric cryptography are eliminated in
asymmetric systems, also known as public key cryptography. 190
guessing fifteen bit number combinations, they were able to find a Netscape key within
one weekend. Id.
183. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 374.
184. Id. at 375; INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DvsION, SECTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES 8 (1996) [hereinafter A.B.A. DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]; Thomas W. Cashel, Symposium: Financial Services: Security, Pri-
vacy, and Encryption, 3 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 4 (1997); Basle Report on Payment and
Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 58.
185. See Federal Information Processing Standard 46, Data Encryption Standard,
48 Fed. Reg. 41,062 (1983) (stating that Secretary of Commerce is authorized to estab-
lish uniform Federal automatic data processing standards under provisions of 40 U.S.C.
§ 759(f), and Executive Order 11717, 38 Fed. Reg. 12315). Id. The Data Encryption
Standard was developed by IBM and issued by the National Bureau of Standards as the
Federal Information Processing Standard ("FIPS") on January 15, 1977. Id.; see also
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 417-18 (discussing development of Data Encryption
Standard). In its Recommendation 4.1, the National Research Council stated that
"[p]roducts providing confidentiality at a level that meets most general commercial
requirements should be easily exportable. Today, products with encryption capabilities
that incorporate the 56-bit DES algorithm provide this level of confidentiality and
should be easily exportable." CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 312.
186, CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at table Cl.
187. See Charles R. Merrill, A Cryptography Primer (visited Aug. 1, 1997) <http://
cla.org/RuhBook/chp2.htm> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(comparing mechanics of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 8; Cashel, supra
note 184, 48; Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 58.
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Asymmetric cryptography is based on one-way functions.1 91 For
example, it is easy to multiply two prime numbers, but exceed-
ingly difficult to compute the inverse function, which amounts
to finding the product's factors.1 92 In asymmetric systems, the
two primes represent the private key known only to the sender,
and the product of the two primes represents the public key,
which can be freely distributed. 93 A message encrypted with the
public key can only be decrypted with the private key, and vice-
versa. 194 Because asymmetric encryption generally involves more
complicated functions than symmetric systems, it requires more
processing time and computer hardware.19 The resulting
higher cost has inhibited acceptance of asymmetric cryptogra-
phy by SVC manufacturers.1 96 An example of the asymmetric
system is RSA,1 9 7 developed by Ron Divest, Adi Shamir, and Leo-
nard Adelman in 1977.198 The RSA technology1 99 is patented 20 0
and distributed by RSA Data Security Corporation. 20 1 There are
currently more than eighty million copies of RSA programs in-
stalled worldwide.20 2
3. Digital Signatures
In addition to encoding messages, cryptography also plays
an integral role in the mechanics of digital signatures. 20 3 Digital
191. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 376 (noting that one way functions are
easy to compute but difficult to undo).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Kerben, supra note 15, at 129; Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Sys-
tems, supra note 2, at 58; A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 8.
195. See Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 58
(comparing operation of DES and RSA systems).
196. Id.
197. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 277 (stating that RSA is an acronym
for its creators, Rivest, Shamir and Adelman and generally refers to asymmetric cryptog-
raphy).
198. See Kerben, supra note 15, at 129-30 (describing development and mechanics
of RSA).
199. See id. (explaining mathematical process of calculating RSA keys).
200. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 228-30 (listing patent issues related to
cryptography).
201. See PR NEWSWIRE, RSA Data Security to Provide Software to Secure Internet; DN-
Ssafe(TM) Software Prevents Address Spoofing, Supports IETF's DNSSEC Standard, Oct. 6,
1997 (stating that RSA Data Security Inc. is wholly owned subsidiary of Security Dynam-
ics Technologies Inc., which sells wide range of software utilizing RSA algorithm).
202. Id.
203. See A. Michael Froomkin, Symposium: Innovation and the Information Environ-
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signatures enable virtually foolproof authentication by encrypt-
ing a message digest created by a hash function with one's pri-
vate key.2°4 The hash function algorithm20 5 translates an entire
ment: The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce,, 75 OR. L. REv. 49
(1996) at 54-55 (discussing role of digital signature as authentication tool); Field, supra
note 55, at 981-91 (discussing acceptance of digital signatures to authenticate electronic
transmissions); A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 8-17 (describ-
ing operation of digital signatures); Note by Secretariat: Planning of Future Work on Elec-
tronic Commerce: Digital Signatures, Certification Authorities and Related Issues, U.N. Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, 31st Sess., at 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV (1997)
[hereinafter UN Secretariat Note on Digital Signatures] (explaining that individual
signs electronic message by encrypting it with his or her private key). The recipient of a
digitally-signed message will decrypt it with the sender's unique public key, thus verify-
ing the sender's identity. Id. The United States federal government adopted a digital
signature algorithm for use by all federal departments and agencies on May 19, 1994:
[The Federal Digital Signature Standard] specifies a Digital Signature Al-
gorithm (DSA) appropriate for applications requiring a digital rather than
written signature. The DSA digital signature is a pair of large numbers repre-
sented in a computer as strings of binary digits. The digital signature is com-
puted using a set of rules (i.e., the DSA) and a set of parameters such that the
identity of the signatory and integrity of the data can be verified. The DSA
provides the capability to generate and verify signatures. Signature verifica-
tion makes use of a public key which corresponds to, but is not the same as,
the private key. Each user possesses a private and public key pair. Public keys
are assumed to be known to the public in general. Private keys are never
shared. Anyone can verify the signature of a user by employing that user's
public key. Signature generation can be performed only by the possessor of
the user's private key.
Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186, Digital Signa-
ture Standard (DES), 59 Fed. Reg. 26,208 (1994).
204. See A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 8 (noting that
digital signatures use asymmetric rather than symmetric cryptography).
205. Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-1, Se-
cure Hash Standard (SHS), 60 Fed. Reg. 19,211 (1995). Shortly after approving the
DES, the federal government published the corresponding standard for a hash al-
gorithm:
This Standard specifies a secure hash algorithm, SHA-1, for computing a con-
densed representation of a message or a data file. When a message of any
length < 2' bits is input, the SHA-1 produces a 160-bit output called a message
digest. The message digest can then be input to the Digital Signature Al-
gorithm (DSA) which generates or verifies the signature for the message ....
Signing the message digest rather than the message often improves the effi-
ciency of the process because the message digest is usually much smaller in
size than the message. The same hash algorithm must be used by the verifier
of a digital signature as was used by the creator of the digital signature.
The SHA-1 is called secure because it is computationally infeasible to find a
message which corresponds to a given message digest, or to find two different
messages which produce the same message digest. Any change to a message in
transit will, with very high probability, result in a different message digest and
the signature will fail to verify.
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message into a single value called a hash result or checksum,
which is normally much shorter than the message itself.2 °6 Be-
cause the hash function calculates the checksum of a particular
message, the checksum result will uniquely reflect that
message.2 °7 An individual signs the message by encoding the
checksum with his or her private key and attaching the result to
the message. 20 8 The verification of the digital signature involves
decrypting the checksum with the sender's public key.2 9 By us-
ing the hash function to compute the hash value anew and then
comparing it with the hash value computed by the original
sender, the receiver verifies that the message was unaltered in
transit.210
Unlike written signatures, unique to the signer and nor-
mally difficult to forge, a public key by itself indicates no particu-
lar individual. 21 ' The receiver of a signed message, therefore,
needs some other verification of the signer's identity besides
tender of a public key.212 A widely accepted means of resolving
206. See A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 9 (defining hash
function as algorithm that computes number based on particular message); CRISIS
REPORT, supra note 5, at 367 (noting that checksums were originally used to detect
errors in electronic transmissions).
207. See A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 9 (noting that it
is computationally infeasible to attempt to derive original message from hash value due
to cost and time required).
208. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 367-68 (stating that private and public
keys are mathematically related, so that checksum encrypted with private key can only
be decrypted with public key). The recipient of a signed message will, for example, see
the following:
I, Mary Smith, promise to pay to the order of First Western Bank five thousand
dollars and no cents ($5,000) on or before June 10, 1998, with interest at the
rate of fifteen per cent (15%) per annum.
Mary Smith, Maker
</Signed>
<Signature SigID=l PsnID=smith082>
2AB3764578CC18946A29870F40198B240CD23
02B2349802DE002342B212990BA5330249C1D
20774C1622D39</Signature>
A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 12.
209. A Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cyptographic
Key "Escrow," 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 29 n.64 (1996) (discussing digital signature
process and noting that anyone who has sender's public key can verify integrity of signa-
ture).
210. UN Secretariat Note on Digital Signatures, supra note 203, 26.
211. See ABA DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 13 (stating that "a
public and private key pair has no intrinsic association with any person.").
212. Id.
828 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:799
this difficulty lies in the creation of trusted third parties, or certi-
fication authorities, to issue certificates authorizing the holder to
use a specific key pair.213 A party can check the authenticity of a
certificate by verifying the certification authority's electronic sig-
nature using a public key verified by yet another certification au-
thority.214
4. Cryptography and Digital Cash
Because each electronic coin contains a unique serial
number authenticated by the issuer's electronic signature,2 1 5 the
coin's redemption links its original holder to the transaction if
213. See UN Secretariat Note on Digital Signatures, supra note 203, 68(a) (1)
(stating that "[a]n authorized certification authority shall keep a publicly accessible
electronic register of certificates issued, indicating when the individual certificate was
issued, when it expires or when it was suspended or revoked."); The A.B.A. DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES note that:
A person seeking to verify a digital signature needs, at minimum, (1) the pub-
lic key corresponding to the private key used to create the digital signature,
and (2) reliable evidence that the public key (and thus the corresponding
private key of the key pair) is identified with the signer. The basic purpose of
the certificate is to serve both these needs in a reliable manner.
A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at comment 29; The Utah Digi-
tal Signature Act provides that:
(1) A[n electronic] message is as valid, enforceable, and effective as if it had
been written on paper, if it:
(a) bears in its entirety a digital signature; and
(b) that digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a certificate
which:
(I) was issued by a licensed certification authority; and
(ii) was valid at the time the digital signature was created.
(2) Nothing in this chapter precludes any message, document or record from
being considered written or in writing under other applicable state law.
Utah Digital Signature Act, Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-403 (1997).
214. A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 15; The UN Secreta-
riat Note on Digital Signatures states that:
[tlo assure the authenticity of the certificate with respect to both its contents
and its source, the certification authority digitally signs it. The issuing certifi-
cation authority's signature on the certificate can be verified by using the pub-
lic key of the authorization authority listed in another certificate by another
certification authority... ,and that other certificate can in turn be authenti-
cated by the public key listed in yet another certificate, and so on, until the
person relying on the digital signature is adequately assured of its genuine-
ness.
UN Secretariat Note on Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 203, 37(a).
215. See Law, supra note 2, at 1139 (stating that, in context of electronic coins,
term bank can also refer to financial institution that issues and clears coins).
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only the issuer keeps sufficient records.216 Consumers can avoid
this by using blinded coins. 2 17 The consumer creates a blinded
coin by creating a serial number and then obscuring it with a
random quantity called the blinding factor. 218 The bank signs
the blinded coin with its private key in exchange for payment
corresponding to the coin's value, not knowing either the iden-
tity of the consumer or the serial number of the coin.21 9 The
consumer then removes the blinding factor, revealing the coin's
signed serial number, and forwards the coin to a merchant.
220
Unlike in the on-line system, where the merchant will not give
up merchandise before ensuring the coin's validity, a blinded
coin in the off-line system presents unique security concerns be-
cause neither the bank nor the merchant know the identity of
the consumer.22 1 The challenge-response protocol prevents the
fraudulent use of blinded coins by requiring the consumer to
forward a single piece of identifying information during each
transaction.222 The information remains encrypted during the
first use.2 23 If the consumer attempts to spend a previously-re-
deemed coin, it will reveal the personal information linking the
criminal to the fraud.2 24
In addition to ensuring the anonymity of electronic coins,
cryptography plays a central role in the administration of digital
payment systems. 225 Called the cornerstone of digital money,
216. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 458 (discussing drawbacks of basic coin
model).
217. See id. at 460 (stating that "[u] sing 'blinded coins', [a consumer] can acquire
digital cash with a unique serial number from a bank without allowing the bank to
create a record of the coin's serial number").
218. See Law, supra note 2, at 1139 (describing blinding process); Froomkin,
supra note 29, at 460 (discussing the blinding factor); See DigiCash, Numbers that are
Money, (1994) at 1 (visited Sept. 1, 1997) <http://www.eff.org/pub /... money/digi-
cash.brochure> (also on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter
DigiCash Brochure] (discussing how the user's equipment creates a blinded coin).
219. DigiCash Brochure, supra note 218, at 2; Law, supra note 2, at 1141; Froom-
kin, supra note 29, at 460.
220. DigiCash Brochure, supra note 218, at 2; Law, supra note 2, at 1141; Froom-
kin, supra note 29, at 460.
221. Froomkin, supra note 29, at 463; Law, supra note 2 at 1141.
222. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 463 n.256 (discussing challenge-response pro-
tocol and developer, David Chaum).
223. See Law, supra note 2, at 1142 (describing electronic cash payment system
using challenge-response).
224. Id.
225. See Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 14 (stat-
ing that "[c ] ryptography is one of the most important components of fraud prevention
1998] 829
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cryptography ensures the confidentiality of electronic payment
messages.226 Furthermore, cryptography prevents forgery of dig-
ital money by allowing issuers to certify its authenticity using dig-
ital signatures.2 2 7 Digital signatures also allow the verification of
the signatory's identity and the integrity of the transmission. 228
Finally, cryptographic authentication techniques can serve as ac-
cess controls to various online systems.229
5. Security of the Cryptographic Code
The difficulty in breaking cryptography lies not in the com-
plexity of the process, but rather in the magnitude of the task
itself.2 0 An intruder wishing to decrypt a message encrypted
with a DES231 key, for example, would have attempt 256 different
combinations to. find the correct fifty-six bit key.23 2 In 1977,
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman estimated that the exhaus-
tive brute force 233 attack on DES would cost 234 approximately
in all electronic money systems"); see also LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 67 (stat-
ing that "[e]ncryption is essential to creating a secure environment for digital money; it
is essential to creating digital money per se.").
226. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 69 (noting that all Internet busi-
nesses rely on cryptography to ensure confidentiality of customer data); see also CRISIS
REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 (asserting that confidentiality aspect of cryptography is
solely responsible for controversy surrounding proposals to regulate it).
227. See Basle Report on Payment and Settlement Systems, supra note 2, at 14 (dis-
cussing use of digital signatures in software-based electronic payment systems to prevent
tampering with financial information such as available balance).
228. See A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 10-11 (describing
process of digital signature verification).
229. See LYNCH & LUNDQUIST, supra note 3, at 70-71 (describing how encryption is
used in operation of pin number to access one's bank account through ATM); see also
CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 56 (noting possible uses of cryptographic access con-
trols such as dial-in ports and audit records).
230. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 378-83 (analyzing attacks on crypto-
graphic systems).
231. See id. at 227 (stating that U.S. government rejected RSA asymmetric technol-
ogy as national digital signature standard in favor of DES, symmetric system which of-
fered cost efficiency and royalty-free use). See also id. at 388 (describing DES as most
widely studied cryptographic system).
232. Id. at 388.
233. See Froomkin, supra note 203, at 43 (stating that term brute force attack refers
to method of finding cryptographic keys by using any combination of digits from range
of possible keys until correct key is found).
234. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 385 (noting that, because microprocessor
speed doubles on the average of once every 18 months and thus cost of computation
decreases by factor of 10 every 5 to 7 years, computation which costs US$1 billion today
may cost only US$10 in 50 years).
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US$10,000 per key. 35 Only thirteen years later, M.J. Wiener esti-
mated that a computer built with then-existing technology could
produce a DES key in three and one half' hours at a cost of
around US$1 million per computer and US$80.00 per key.236
Today, a standard US$10,000 machine could break a forty bit
key in less than a second.23 v Commentators point out, however,
that manufacturers of cryptographic technology will eventually
eliminate all risk of code breaking by developing sufficiently
long keys. 23 ' For example, a recent study found that, in order to
decode a message encoded with a 1,024 bit key, one would need
one hundred computers with eight megabytes of memory oper-
ating at one hundred MHz for 280,000 years.23 9
Because asymmetric cryptography uses the product of two
prime numbers for encryption and the two original primes for
decryption, cracking an asymmetric system involves factoring in-
tegers and finding discrete logarithms.24 ° Unlike a brute force
attack on DES, where attackers must try every possible combina-
tion of digits in a fifty-six bit number, the ease of factoring the
public key to reveal the private key depends on the factoring
method.241 In 1995, for example a Bellcore team factored RSA-
129, a 129 digit RSA key, in response to a 1977 challenge posted
by Michael Gardner in his Scientific American mathematical
games column.242 Using a unique factoring method, Bellcore's
Mas Par supercomputer, and the computers of 1600 volunteers
recruited over the Internet, the Bellcore team factored RSA-129
235. Whitfield Diffie & Martin Hellman, Exhaustive Cryptanalysis of the NBS Data
Encryption Standard, COMPUTER, June 1977, at 74.
236. CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 388.
237. Froomkin, supra note 203, at 43. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 389
(suggesting that government oversight of large expenditures on computer technology
could ensure that large corporations or criminal organizations do not attempt to gain
access to encrypted information for illegal purposes).
238. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 380 n.17 (stressing that formulation of
cryptographic key which would necessitate number of operations greater than practical
limits of physics could ostensibly eliminate problem of advancement in computer tech-
nology); id. at 379-80 (stating that "[w] ith a sufficiently long key, even an eavesdropper
with very extensive computer resources would have to take a very long time (longer
than the age of the universe) to test all possible combinations").
239. Kerben, supra note 15, at 129.
240. See id. at 385 n.23 (explaining discrete logarithms).
241. Id. at 386; See Levy, supra note 182 at 4 (discussing mathematical principles of
encryption).
242. See Taubes, supra note 15, at 776 (noting that asymmetric encryption was new
concept when Gardner posted challenge).
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in eight months.24 3 Their 129 digit, 425 bit key cracked, RSA
labs has noted that the current RSA tool kit allows development
of 1,024 bit keys. 24 4 Discovery of new factoring algorithms and
development of faster and more efficient computer technology
will determine how long such keys will remain useful.2 45
6. Regulating Cryptography: Key Escrow
The conventional meaning of the word escrow implies the
giving over of some thing of value for safekeeping along with
precise instructions on how to do so. 246 In the context of cryp-
tography, escrow represents the placement of a private crypto-
graphic key with an agency or the government in order to en-
sure quick recovery when needed.247 In addition to providing
law enforcement with quick access to encrypted data, key escrow
also serves as a means to retrieve lost or corrupted keys.248 Fur-
thermore, proponents of the widespread use of electronic signa-
tures suggest that individuals' public keys, which allow identifica-
tion of the signatory, should be issued and held in escrow by
trusted third parties.249  Having issued the signatory's key, a
trusted third party, also called a certification authority, 250 can
verify the signatory's true identity.251
Trusted third parties can also be useful in retrieving crypto-
243. See id. (explaining operation of algorithm used to factor RSA-129). Measured
in mips years, where one mips year represents a machine running for one year at one
million instructions per second, the Bellcore RSA-129 experiment used about 5,000
mips years. Levy, supra note 182, at 5.
244. Wirbel, supra note 15, at 1. Ronald Rivest of RSA labs claimed that a 400 digit
number, which amounts to approximately 1320 bits, "may be 300 billion times more
difficult" to crack than the 129 digit, 425 bit number. Taubes, supra note 15, at 776. See
Kerben, supra note 15, at 129 (noting recent study finding that, in order to crack 1,024
bit key, one would need one hundred million computers with eight Megabytes of RAM
operating at 100 MHz for 280,000 years).
245. See Taubes, supra note 15, at 776 (stating that Bellcore team announced their
intention to develop new factoring algorithms to factor larger numbers more efficiently
at very press conference during which they presented solution to RSA-129).
246. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note,5, at 167-69 (explaining escrowed encryption).
247. Id. at 168.
248. Id.
249. See A.B.A. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 14 (suggesting
trusted third parties as solution to problems of falsification and repudiation of digital
signatures).
250. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 355 (defining certification authority as "a
specially established trusted organization that accepts the responsibilities of managing
the certificate process by issuing, distributing, and verifying certificates.").
251. A.B.A DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 14.
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graphic keys through key management systems. 252 Key manage-
ment differs from key escrow in that it does not require deposit-
ing cryptographic keys with a third party. 253 Rather, a key man-
agement recovery agent uses its own key to encrypt the private
key that was used to encode a document. 2"4 The resulting en-
crypted private key, also known as the session key, is then at-
tached to the transmission. 5  Law enforcement authorities
seeking to decrypt this transmission need only require the key
recovery agent to decrypt the session key.256
C. Money Laundering
In its 1996-1997, Report on Money Laundering Typolo-
gies,257 the Financial Task Force on Money Laundering 25
("FATF") noted the impossibility of gauging the true size of the
money-laundering industry.259 In 1988, estimates of the amount
252. Jon William Toigo, Key Recovery Spawns Debate; The Key Recovery Management
Initiative May Hurt Encryption Sales Rather Than Help, DATABASED WEB ADVISER, Aug. 1997,
at 70.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. See CRISIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 377 (discussing creation of key distri-
bution center ("KDC") that holds copies of users' private keys that are used to encrypt
session keys).
256. See Toigo, supra note 252, at 70 (noting that although key management does
not require users to hand over copies of cryptographic keys to government, end result is
same and thus implicates same privacy issues).
257. 1997 FATF Report, supra note 4.
258. See Lisa A. Barbot, Comments: Money Laundering. An International Challenge, 3
TUL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 161 (1995) (noting that Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering ("FATF") was established at Paris G-7 Summit in 1989). The FATF func-
tions to:
... assess the results of cooperation already undertaken in order to prevent
the utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose
of money laundering, and to consider additional preventive efforts in this
field, including the adoption of the legal and regulatory systems so as to en-
hance multilateral judicial assistance.
Paris Economic Summit: Economic Declaration July 16, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1293, 1299 (1989). Today, the twenty-six FATF member countries include Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singa-
pore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 1997
FATF Report, supra note 4, at 1. The European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation
Council are also members. Id.
259. See 1997 FATF Report, supra note 4, at 3 (stating that FATF Members esti-
mated size of money laundering problem based on amount of money confiscated from
money launderers and that such estimates do not necessarily reflect total amount of
money laundered).
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of money laundered in the United States alone were as high as
US$170 billion annually.260 Similar estimates in 1994 set the
amount at around US$300 billion. 26 1 Traditional. means of de-
tecting and eliminating money laundering include imposing re-
porting requirements on financial institutions that provide
money transfer services.262 Because digital payment systems op-
erate without such services, they permit money launderers to ply
their trade with minimal risk of detection. 263.
1. The Money Laundering Process
Money laundering involves making funds obtained through
criminal activity appear as legitimate earnings.2 64  The entire
260. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 415.
261. Sultzer, supra note 16, at 143.
262. See generally id. at 151-84 (discussing money laundering legislation in United
States mandating financial institutions to maintain reports and records to facilitate in-
vestigations or legal proceedings); Barbot, supra note 258, at 170-81 (discussing anti-
money laundering initiatives of United Nations, Financial Action Task Force, Basle
Committee and European Community which rely on shared access to data maintained
by financial institutions).
263. See, e.g., Electronic Currency: Consumer Convenience, or Money Laundering Incen-
tive?, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATro.NEYS GENERAL FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT, Oct.
1997, at 11 (stating that "[e]lectronic transfers become the preferred money launder-
ing technique because once currency enters the electronic system, it can be transferred
to dozens of banks in as little as 24 hours, making it very difficult to create a paper
trail."); Security: Money Laundering and the Net, THE AMERICAN BANKER, May 12, 1997, at
18 (noting experts' concern that "[i]f not today, as electronic cash systems are popular-
ized, criminals could be lured easily by the instantaneous and potentially anonymous
means by which illicit funds could be moved, domestically or electronically.").
264. See id. at 143 (stating that "money laundering sustains every criminal activity
engaged in for profit, which is to say all crime but crimes of passion or vengeance.");
Baldwin, supra note 78, at 413 (noting that some nations cater to criminals' money
laundering needs to gain direct economic benefit). The European Council has defined
international money-laundering to mean:
-the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of as-
sisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade
the legal consequences of his action,
-the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from criminal activity of from an act of participation in
such activity,
-the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the same time of
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of
participation in such activity,
Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
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process takes place in three steps often termed placement, layer-
ing, and integration.265 Placement, the first step in the money
laundering process,: involves depositing the money at a legiti-
mate business or financial institution 266 Associating the money
with a legitimate source facilitates obscuring its origin in the
next stage, layering.267 Layering involves transferring the money
between a large number of financial institutions and shell 268
legal entities, making it difficult to trace to an illegitimate
source.269 In a recent case,270 for example, drug money was
picked up in various U.S. cities and deposited in different
265. Sultzer, supra note 16, at 148; See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 418 (describing
laundering process as including externalizing, agitation, and repatriation).
266. Sultzer, supra note 16, at 149.
267. Id.
268. See Barbot, supra note 258, at 167 (stating that money launderers use shell or
letter box corporations set up in jurisdictions offering significant financial privacy to
serve as conduits for transferring ill-gotten funds to legitimate institutions).
269. Sultzer, supra note 16, at 149.
270. See Daniel M. Laifer, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International
Banking, Post-BCCI 60 FOROHAM L. REv. 467, 484 (1992) (describing similar case where
Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") laundered more than thirty two
million U.S. dollars in United States). The failure of the $20 billion BCCI on July 5,
1991 marked the largest bank failure in international history. Duncan E. Alford, Basle
Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241 (1992). Although BCCI's holding company and
one of its major banking subsidiaries were chartered in Luxembourg, neither actually
conducted business in that country and thus, under the existing laws, banking regula-
tors in Luxembourg were not required to police BCCI's global operations. Laifer,
supra, at 481. Having "no clear home country supervision," BCCI escaped regulatory
oversight altogether. Alford, supra, at 263. By making bad loans and engaging in a
wide range of fraud and criminal activity, BCCI incurred liabilities amounting to
US$10.641 billion. Id. at 264. In direct. response to the gross lack of international su-
pervision which lead to BCCI's failure, the Basle Committee issued its Minimum Stan-
dards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Es-
tablishments in July of 1992. Id. at 266. The minimum standards include:
1. All international banking groups and international banks should be super-
vised by a home country authority that capably performs consolidated su-
pervision.
2. The creation of cross-border banking should receive the prior consent of
both the host country supervisory authority and the bank's and, if differ-
ent, banking group's home country supervisory authority.
3. Supervisory authorities should possess the right to gather information
from the cross-border banking establishments of the banks or banking
grouped for which they are the home country supervisor.
4. If a host country authority determines that any of the foregoing minimum
standards is not met to satisfaction, that authority could impose restrictive
measures necessary to satisfy its prudential concerns consistent with these
minimum standards, including the prohibition of creation of banking es-
tablishments.
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banks. 27' The funds were wire-transferred from those banks to a
bank account in Florida and then wire-transferred via New York
to Luxembourg and London where they were converted to cer-
tificates of'deposit.2 72 The certificates were used as collateral for
a Nassau bank loan.2 7 3 Sufficiently layered, the laundered
money, now in the form of loan proceeds, could be reintegrated
into the legitimate financial world.27 4
2. Traditional Money Laundering Control Measures
Ratified in Vienna in October of 1990, the U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic 275 ("U.N. Convention") represents one of
the earliest international efforts to combat money laundering.276
Under Article 3(1) of the U.N. Convention, countries must
criminalize cross-border money laundering schemes 277 and en-
Basle Committee, Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking
Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments (July 1992).
271. Sultzer, supra note 16, at 151 n.31.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. See Barbot, supra note 258, at 168 (stating that "once the money is clean, it
is usually wired from the local international branch to a legitimate bank ... [and then]
back to -the United States").
275. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic, supra note 11, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
276. Frank C. Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide
System of Baking Compliance Programs, 3 D.C.L.J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 277, 303 (1994). At the
December 20,1988 signing ceremony, the following nations signed the UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Can-
ada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivore, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Ghana, Guate-
mala, Holy See, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Spain, Suriname,
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Vene-
zuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic, supra note
11, 28 I.L.M. at 493. Morocco signed on December 28, 1988. Id.
277. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic, supra note 11, 28 I.L.M. at 500. The
pertinent part of Article 3 states:
1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as
criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed internationally:
(b) (I) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property
is derived from any offence [involving psychotropic substances as
outlined in Art. 3(1) (a)] for the purpose of concealing or disguising
the illicit origin of the property or of assigning any person who is
involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade
the legal consequences of his action;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature source, loca-
tion, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or owner-
ship of property, knowing that such property is derived from
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act measures allowing law enforcement officers to confiscate
drug money.278 In addition, parties under the U.N. Convention
must work together by maintaining communication and assisting
in judicial proceedings and investigations.279 The U.N. Conven-
tion also allows signatories to place the burden of proof regard-
ing the origin of allegedly illicit property on the property
owner, 280 and, most importantly, limits bank secrecy and confi-
dentiality laws. 281
Under the Council of Europe Convention held in Stras-
bourg in 1990,282 signatory nations283 rallied together to launch
a united front against money laundering. 284 The Council of Eu-
offences [involving psychotropic substances as outlined in Art.
3(1) (a)].
Id.
278. Id. 28 I.L.M. at 504. Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention mandates that:
Each party shall adopt measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:
(a) Proceeds derived from offences [involving psychotropic substances as out-
lined in Art. 3(1)];
Id.
279. Id. 28 I.L.M. at 508. The Convention outlines the extent to which the signa-
tory nations must cooperate in Article 7:
1. The parties shall afford one another, pursuant to this article, the widest
measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and ju-
dicial proceedings in relation to criminal offences [involving psychotropic
substances as outlined in art. 3 par. 1].
2. Mutual legal assistance to be afforded in accordance with this article may
be requested for any of the following purposes:
(a) Taking evidence or statements from persons;
(b) Effecting service of judicial documents;
(c) Executing searches and seizures;
(d) Examining objects and sites;
(e) Providing information and evidentiary items;
(f) Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and
records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records;
(g) Identifying or tracing proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other
things for evidentiary purposes.
Id.
280. Id. 28 I.L.M. at 506.
281. See id. 28 I.L.M. at 509 (stating that "[a] party shall not decline to render
mutual assistance under this article on the ground of bank secrecy.").
282. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 11, 30 I.L.M 148 (1991).
283. Id. Countries which signed the council of Europe Convention on November
8, 1990 included Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id.
284. EC Ministers to Adopt Formally Money Laundering Law, REUTER LiBR. REP.,
Jun. 7, 1991.
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rope Convention echoes the U.N. Convention by requiring na-
tions to cooperate with one another in detecting and confiscat-
ing illicit property28 5 and prosecuting money launderers. 286 The
Council of Europe Convention also mandates that nations ac-
tively monitor telecommunications and minimize the extent to
which bank secrecy laws could hinder efforts to curb money
laundering.28 7
The most recent multinational effort to prevent money
laundering through financial networks is Council Directive 91/
308.288 Also like the U.N. Convention, Council Directive 91/308
notes that measures enacted to curb money laundering will work
only if nations cooperate in a joint effort.2 9 Deriving its defini-
tion of money laundering from the U.N. Convention, 290 Council
285. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 11, 30 I.L.M. 148, 152 (1991).
Laundering offenses which the Convention directs signatory nations to criminalize in-
clude:
(a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is [eco-
nomic benefit derived from criminal activity], for the purpose of conceal-
ing or disguising the illicit origin of the property ....
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, disposition, move-
ment, rights with respect to , or ownership of, property, knowing that
such property is [economic benefit derived from criminal activity] ...
Id.
286. See id. 30 I.L.M. at 153 (stating that "[t]he parties shall co-operate with each
other to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations and proceedings
aiming at the confiscation of instrumentalities and [any economic advantage derived
from criminal activity"). See also id. 30 I.L.M. at 152 (stating that "[e]ach party may
adopt such measures as it considers necessary to establish also as offences under its
domestic law all or some of [the laundering crimes outlined by the Convention]").
287. Id. 30 I.L.M. at 151. Article 4 of the Council of Europe Convention states
that:
1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be nec-
essary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that
bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized in
order to carry out [law enforcement].
2. Each Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to enable it to use special investigative techniques facili-
tating the identification and tracing of proceeds and the gathering of evi-
dence related thereto. Such techniques may include monitoring orders,
observation, interception of telecommunications, access to computer sys-
tems and orders to produce specific documents.
Id.
288. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, OJ. L 166/77 (1991).
289. Barbot, supra note 258, at 179.
290. See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79
(1991) (defining "money laundering"); UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic, supra
note 11, art. 3 (setting forth criminal offenses, including money laundering, to be
criminalized by signatory nations).
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Directive 91/308 mandates that Member States require financial
institutions291 to obtain documents identifying customers in-
volved in transactions of 15,000 ECU or more.292 Council Direc-
tive 91/308 also imposes a duty on financial institutions to inves-
tigate any transactions which appear to involve illicit funds.295 In
addition, Member States must establish authorities responsible
for combating money laundering and laws providing that finan-
cial institutions shall cooperate with the authorities by divulging
pertinent information and refraining from carrying out ques-
294tionable transactions. Furthermore, Member States must en-
sure that financial institutions develop proper internal safe-
guards to detect and report instances of apparent money laun-
291. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
The Directive defines financial institution to include:
... an undertaking other than a credit institution whose principal activity is to
carry out one or more of the operations included in numbers 2 to 12 and
number 14 of the list annexed to Directive 89/646/EEC, or an insurance com-
pany duly authorized in accordance with Directive 79/267/EEC, as last
amended by Directive 90/619/EEC, in so far as it carries out activities covered
by that Directive; this definition includes branches located in the Community
of financial institutions whose head offices are outside the Community.
Id. The operations in the annex to Directive 89/646/EEC include those institutions
which (1) engage in safe custody services, (2) lending (including consumer credit,
mortgage credit, and the financing of commercial transactions), (3) financial leasing,
(4) money transmission services, (5) issuing and administering means of payment
(credit cards, travelers' checks, and banker's drafts), (6) guarantees and commitments,
(7) trading for own account or for that of their customers in money market instru-
ments, foreign exchange, financial futures and options, exchange and interest rate in-
struments, and transferable securities, (8) participating in share issues, (9) advice to
undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related issues such as mergers
and the purchase of undertakings, (10) money broking, (11) portfolio management
and advice, and (12) safekeeping and administration of securities. Second Banking
Directive No. 89/646, art. 18, O.J. L 386/9 at 13 (1989).
292. Council Directive 91/308, supra note 11, art. 3, O.J. L 166/77, at 79-80
(1991).
293. See id. art. 5, O.J. L 166/77, at 80 (1991) (stating that "[m]ember States shall
ensure that credit and financial institutions examine with special attention any transac-
tion which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature to be related to money laun-
dering").
294. See id. art. 3, O.J. L 166/77, at 79-80 (1991) (stating that "[m]ember States
shall ensure that money laundering... is prohibited"); id. art. 4, O.J. L 166/77, at 80
(1991) (stating that "[m] ember States shall ensure that credit and financial institutions
and their directors and employees cooperate fully with the authorities responsible for
combating money laundering. . .. "); id. art. 7, O.J. L 166/77, at 80 (1991) (stating that
"[m]ember States shall ensure-that credit and financial institutions refrain from carry-
ing out transactions which they know or suspect to be related to money laundering
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dering.295
To facilitate international cooperation in combating money
laundering, the United States and other nations have ratified
Mutual Assistance Treaties ("MLATs").296 MLATs expedite the
process of uncovering and prosecuting international money
laundering by, for example, creating binding obligations be-
tween nations to provide key evidence despite domestic privacy
laws.29 7 Generally, MLATs contain provisions enabling the re-
questing state to secure relevant documentation and immobilize
assets obtained through alleged criminal activity.2
9 8
295. Id. art. 11, OJ. L 166/77, at 81 (1991). Article 11 of Council Directive 91/
308 states that:
Member States shall ensure that credit and financial institutions:
1. Establish adequate procedures of internal control and communication in
order to forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering,
2. Take appropriate measures so that their employees are aware of the provi-
sions contained in this Directive. These measures shall include participa-
tion of their relevant employees in special training programmes to help
them recognize operations which may be related to money laundering as
well as to instruct them as to how to proceed in such cases.
Id.
296. Razzano, supra note 276, at 301; Sultzer, supra note 16, at 209.
297. Id. at 301.
298. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Italian Republic on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 11, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 1509, 1536 [hereinafter
Mutual Assistance Treaty Between the United States and Italy]. For example, article 18
of the Mutual Assistance Treaty between the United States and Italy provides that:
1. In emergency situations, the Requested State shall have authority to im-
mobilize assets found in that State which are subject to forfeiture.
2. Following such judicial proceedings as would be required under the laws
of the Requested State, that State shall have the authority to order the
forfeiture to the Requesting State of assets immobilized pursuant to para-
graph 1 of this Article.
Id. art. 18, 24 I.L.M. at 1541-42. Article 1 of assistance treaty between the United States
and the Netherlands exemplifies the usual extent of assistance guaranteed by an MLAT:
1. The Contracting Parties undertake to afford each other, upon request and
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, mutual assistance in
criminal investigations and proceedings.
2. Assistance shall include, but not be limited to:
a. locating persons;
b. serving documents;
c. providing records;
d. taking the testimony or statements of persons;
e. producing documents;
f. executing requests for search and seizure; and
g. transferring persons in custody for testimonial purposes.
Netherlands-United States: Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance,June 12, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
48, 50.
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By enacting the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970299 ("BSA"), the
U.S. Government recognized the importance of maintaining a
paper trail whereby. law enforcement could trace large transac-
tions by financial institutions."' Under the BSA, financial insti-
tutions conducting transactions on behalf of a single individual
involving US$10,000 or more in the aggregate must file an Inter-
nal Revenue Service3" ' ("IRS") Form 4789 Currency Transaction
Report ("CTR") .302 In addition, the BSA requires that any per-
son transporting monetary instruments worth more than
US$10,000 across United States borders must so declare by filing
a Currency and Monetary Instrument Report ("CMIR").303 The
BSA also requires financial institutions to generally report suspi-
cious transactions. 4 No BSA provision, however, imposes rec-
ord keeping or reporting requirements on wire transfers not in-
volving the physical transfer of currency. 05
299. Pub. L. No, 91-598, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5311-5344).
300. See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 424 (discussing legislation passed to combat
money laundering). Under the Bank Secrecy Act, financial institution means: (1) an
insured bank, (2) a commercial bank or trust company, (3) a private banker, (4) an
agency or branch of a foreign bank in the United States, (5) an insured institution, (6)
a thrift institution, (7) a broker or dealer registered with the SEC, (8) a broker or
dealer in securities or commodities, (9) an investment banker or investment company,
(10) a currency exchange, (11) an issuer, redeemer, or cashier of traveler's checks, (12)
an operator of a credit card system, (13) an insurance company, (14) a dealer in pre-
cious metals, stones, orjewels, (15) a pawnbroker, (16) a loan or finance company, (17)
a travel agency, (18) a licensed sender of money, (19) a telegraph company, (20) a
business engaged in car, airplane, or, boat sales, (21) persons involved in real estate
closings or settlements, (22) The U.S. Postal Service, (23) an agency of the U.S., state,
or local government carrying out a duty or power of a business described in
§ 5312(a)(2), (24) any business that the Secretary of the Treasury determines is an
activity under § 5312(a) (2), and (25) any other business designated by the Secretary
whose cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
matters. The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1994).
301. See John C. Chommie, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 9 (1970) (stating that
U.S. Congress established Office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue under Revenue
Act of 1862 in order to implement new, broader tax system).
302. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § §103.33-.34; see Sultzer, supra note 16, at
152 (discussing BSA Currency Transaction Report ("CTR") filing requirement); Bar-
bot, supra note 258, at 188 (noting that financial institutions falling under BSA filed
more than 30 million CTRs between 1970 and 1995).
303. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (1) (1994); see Sultzer, supra note 16, at 152 n.50 (discuss-
ing history of Currency and Monetary Instrument Report ("CMIR") requirement). The
CMIR does not apply to cross-border wire transfers. Id. at 152.
304. See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 425 (explaining BSA reporting requirements).
305. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & RobertJ. Munro, Money Laundering and the 1995
Wire Transfer Regulations: Are Regulations Alone Adequate to Take the Profit Out of Illicit Wire
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Soon after the enactment of the BSA, criminals quickly
found ways to escape the reporting requirement by smurfing 30 6
or structuring30 7 payments, which simply involved transferring
an amount less than US$10,000 per transaction.3° To remedy
this apparent weakness, Congress amended 30 9 the BSA with the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA") .3'0 The
MLCA criminalized structuring payments and inhibiting a finan-
cial institution's efforts to satisfy the reporting requirements. 311
Also around this time, law enforcement authorities began to
note the internationalization of money laundering and the in-
creasing difficulty and cost of following the paper trail of illegiti-
mate money.312 Criminals' use of wire transfer systems, unregu-
lated until 1995, represented the main reason for this increased
Transfers?, in 1 MONEY LAUNDERING, ASSET FORFEITURE AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
CRIMES 15 (1995) (discussing wire transfers before BSA reporting requirements).
306. See Barbot, supra note 258, at 186 (defining smurfing as intentionally arrang-
ing transactions to circumvent reporting requirements).
307. See Sultzer, supra note 16, at 158 (discussing drawbacks of BSA resulting from
structuring).
308. Barbot, supra note 258, at 186.
309. See Baldwin, supra note 78, at 425 (discussing legislative history of BSA). The
BSA was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473,
Tide II, Oct. 12,1984, the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. 1956-1957,
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of- 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, Nov. 18, 1988, and the Annunzio-
Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550. Id.
310. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956-1957, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-5326); see also Sultzer, supra note 16, at 158 (discussing
congressional intent in passing the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA")).
311. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994). This section provides that:
(a) ... No person shall for the purpose' of evading the reporting require-
ments ...
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file
a report under section 5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed
under any such section;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a
report ... that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact;
or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial insti-
tutions.
Id. After the Supreme Court held in Ratzlafv. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994), that
convictions under this section required willful violation, Congress explicitly dispensed
with the willfulness requirement by passing the Money Laundering Suppression Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325 § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994). Sultzer, supra note 16, at
168.
312. See Dilwyn Griffiths, International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: Develop-
ments and Prospects, 19 COMMONWEALTH LAW BULLETIN 1824 (1993) (stating that money
laundering problem has grown in size and complexity since 1989).
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burden on law enforcement.3 13 The instantaneous economy cre-
ated by newly-emerging information and electronic finance tech-
nologies threatened to render the existing money laundering
safeguards utterly useless. 314 In 1995, the Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network 315  ("FinCen") and the Federal Reserve
Board jointly enacted an amendment to the BSA regulations to
facilitate tracing money laundering via wire transfer systems.31 6
The new regulations require financial institutions317 conducting
wire transfers to maintain detailed records3 18 concerning pay-
313. See Barbot, supra note 258, at 193 (stating that wire transfers resulted in inter-
nationalization of money laundering).
314. See id. at 196 (noting money laundering prevention difficulties caused by new
technologies).
315. See Sultzer, supra note 16, at 179 (describing FinCen). FinCen, an acronym
for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, is one of six Treasury Department
agencies active in the fight against money laundering. Id. Established in 1990, this 200-
employee organization collects data and analyses issues related to financial crimes and
money laundering. Id. at 180.
316. See 58 Fed. Reg. 46,014-015 (1993) (stating purpose of new regulations as
prevention of money laundering via wire transfers).
317. Financial Record keeping and Reporting of Currency and Transactions, 31
C.F.R. § 103.11(n). The regulations define financial institution to mean:
[e]ach agent, agency, branch, or office within the United States of any person
doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an organized business
concern, in one or more of the capacities listed below:
(1) A bank (except bank credit card systems);
(2) A broker or dealer in securities;
(3) A currency dealer or exchanger, including a person engaged in the busi-
ness of a check cashier;
(4) An issuer, seller, or redeemer of traveler's checks or money orders except
as a selling agent exclusively who does not sell more than $150,000 of such
instruments within any given 30-day period;
(5) A licensed transmitter of funds, or other person engaged in the business
of transmitting funds;
(6) A telegraph company;
Id. The regulation defines funds transfer as "[t]he series of transactions, beginning
with the originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the
beneficiary of the order...." Id. § 103.11 (q). The definition excludes fund transfers
governed by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978 and all money transfers made by
means of an automated clearinghouse. Id.
318. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Relating to Record Keeping
for Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds by Financial Institutions, 60 Fed. Reg.
220, 229-31 (1995). The regulations require banks and non-bank financial institutions
transmitting US$3,000 or more to keep records relating to the payment order includ-
ing:
(A) The name and address of the originator;
(B) The amount of the payment order';
(C) The execution date of the payment order;
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ment orders for a period of five years. 19 Previously unregulated
payment order transactions including those conducted by
FedWire, CHIPS, and SWIFT fall under the new regulations. 20
3. The New Challenge for Law Enforcement: Laundering
Digital Money
Commentators and legal authorities around the world look
on with increasing anxiety as technological innovations drive the
development of payment systems that threaten to emasculate
current money laundering safeguards.321 For example, the
FATF has recommended that nations reevaluate their exiting
money laundering controls to determine whether they provide
(D) Any payment instructions received from the originator with the payment
order;
(E) The identity of the beneficiary's bank; and
(F) [any other available information about the recipient of the funds]
Id. The regulations also require an institution acting as intermediary to keep a copy of
the payment order. Id. at 229-30.
319. Id. at 228. The regulations define payment order to mean:
[a]n instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electroni-
cally, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determi-.
nable amount of money to a beneficiary if:
(1) The instruction does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary
other than time of payment;
(2) The receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or
otherwise receiving payment from, the sender; and
(3) The instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving bank
or to an agent, funds transfer system, or communication system for trans-
mittal to the receiving bank.
Id.
320. Baldwin, supra note 78, at 432.
321. See World's Laundering Laws Being Outpaced by Technology, U.S. Says, 7 MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT 11 (April 1996) (stating that "'the money laundering problem con-
fronting policymakers and enforcement agencies [is] becoming ever more complex
and pervasive,' according to the annual U.S. State Department on the state of the
world's money laundering and drug trafficking problems."); see also id. (stating that
"[t] he benefits of using 'cybercurrency' to launder money surpass those of conventional
currency" according to the International Narcotics control Strategy Report released in
April of 1996); Sultzer, supra note 16, at 184 (stating that "[b]anks have, in effect,
become the government's 'front line defense' in the fight against money laundering
[and consequently] money laundering has moved out of the highly regulated world of
mainstream banking."). The 1997 FATF Report notes that:
[a]s regards money laundering techniques, the most noticeable trend is the
continuing increase in the use by money launderers of non-bank financial in-'
stitutions and non-financial businesses relative to banking institutions. This is
believed to reflect the increased level of compliance by banks with anti-money
laundering measures.
1997 FATF Report, supra note 4, 73.
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sufficient safeguards in digital cash systems. 22 Citing the FATF
report, a Group of Ten 323 Working Party"3 24 Report on Electronic
Money. also stressed that money laundering dangers created by
electronic money systems necessitate close monitoring of this
emerging technology to prevent any potential criminal activ-
ity.
2 5
The most dangerous aspects of electronic money making it
conducive to money laundering are its speed32 6 and anonym-
ity.327 Fortified by cryptography, electronic money precludes re-
322. 1997 FATF Report, supra note 4, 65. The'FATF has noted that primary
concerns raised by potential criminal use of digital money include:
... (a) the need to review and potentially revise existing regulatory regimes to
ensure adequate supervision of all types of e-money providers; (b) whether
accurate and adequate records of transactions and persons involved will be
available; (c) stored value cards may be more difficult to detect than physical
currency; and (d) the speed and volume of e-money transactions may make it
more difficult to track or identify unusual patterns of financial transactions.
Id.
323. See Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analysis of Swap Risks and
a Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord's Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 259,
261 (1995) (stating that Group of Ten ("G-10") nations include Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United King-
dom, and United States).
324. See Group of Ten Report on Electronic Money, supra note 4, at 39 (noting
that members of the Working Party include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, International Monetary Fund, European Commission, Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and European Monetary Insti-
tute).
325. Id. at 12.
326. See 1997 FATF Report, supra note 4, at 34 (stating that [t]he rapid move-
ment of e-money ... will make it difficult for law enforcement to identify or track these
fund transfers."); Platts, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that "[t]he speed that makes [elec-
tronic money systems] efficient and the anonymity that makes it secure, make the sys-
tem even more attractive to the launderer.").
327. See id. at annex 1, 3 (stating that "[e]lectronic money (e-money) has the
potential to make it easier for criminals to hide the source of their proceeds and move
those proceeds without detection."); In addition to digital payment systems, banks op-
erating on the Internet may also be exploited by criminals for money laundering pur-
poses. See Hughes, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that, because Internet or "cyberspace"
banks do not accept deposits and restrict their activities to acting as intermediaries in
online purchases, they are not subject to federal or state regulation). See also Sultzer,
supra note 16, at 195 (stating that "[c]yberbanks do not currently accept deposits;
rather, they act as intermediaries in financial transactions and sales."); Sarah Jane
Hughes, "Phantom" Cyberbanks Pose Laundering, Tax Evasion Threat, 6 MONEY LAUNDERINC
ALERT 4 (July 1995) (stating that "[t]he international consequences of cyberbanking
are obvious . . . cyberbanks will permit the movement of billions of dollars across na-
tional boundaries annually."); Hughes, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that online money
transfers facilitate money laundering because "[ellectronic mail messages, aided by en-
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tracing the countless transfers in the layering and placement
stages of the laundering process.328 Commentators warn that
this problem will increase exponentially with the increased use
of electronic wallets, which allow cross border person-to-person
transfers of funds via telephone lines or computer networks. 29
Conducted outside the regulated network of financial institu-
tion, such transfers may thwart current measures enacted to pre-
vent money laundering unless law enforcement officials can
trace the funds without relying on paper trails.3 °
II. THE KEY ESCROW DEBATE
The French,331 Russian,332 and British3 3 governments have
cryption and cyberspace banking transfers, will enable launderers to transfer assets
around the world many times a day.").
328. See Spemow, supra note 16, at 14 (stating that "[u]nbreakable encryption is
the primary factor that puts CyberCrooks at an advantage over law enforcement...
[c]urrent CyberCops agree and predict that there will be a substantial increase in cases
where [they] were able to avoid prosecution because evidence that would have con-
victed them is encrypted and therefore unexaminable."); see also Sultzer, supra note 16,
at 195 (noting that development of strong cryptography will enable cyberbanks to ex-
pand their money laundering activities).'
329. See Hughes, supra note 13, at 1 (stating that SVC technology enables individu-
als to move cash around the world via ATM); see also Sultzer, supra note 16, at 197
(noting ease with which electronic wallets are adopted for money laundering purposes
because they enable transfer of money between over phone wires without intervention
of banks).
330. See Froomkin, supra note 29, at 477 (stating that "[if] digital cash that does
not have to be cleared through a bank... becomes widespread, the ability of authori-
ties to control money laundering will depend greatly on the extent to which the
scheme allows authorities to trace the funds."); see also G-1O Nations Chart Course for
Cyberlaundering Controls, 8 MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT 10, 11 (1997) (stating that "[t]he
speed, anonymity and international nature of cyberpayments systems thwart the subjec-
tive evaluations required in suspicious activity reporting, which has become the focal
point of global laundering controls.").
331. See Froomkin, supra note 209, at 60 (noting that France currently has most
developed cryptography regulations in Europe, and recently passed laws relaxing con-
trol over escrowed cryptography). The proposed amendment to the French Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 lays the foundation for establishing key escrow authorities:
II -The bodies responsible for managing the secret keys pertaining to encryp-
tion devices and services which provide confidentiality, on behalf of third par-
ties, shall be subject to prior approval from the Prime Minister.
A State Council decree shall define the conditions governing the approval of
these organizations and shall set out the. procedures and technical provisions
required to implement [their obligations as set forth in the French Telecom-
munications Act].
French Key Escrow Regulation, supra note 18, art. 17.
332. See Russia Wants to Adopt Key Escrow, IND. PUB. INT. NEWSLTR., Jan. 30, 1997
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expressed an interest in establishing key escrow to fortify the in-
terests of law enforcement in fighting electronic crime. Similar
to the, Clinton Administration's Clipper III ' "4 proposal, the Brit-
ish proposed key escrow system utilizes a network of trusted
third parties to hold and manage private keys. 3 5 The European
Community and United States disagree on the proper means to
implement key escrow.336 While EC officials have opined that
key escrow should develop as a product of market forces, the
United States supports aggressive implementation of key escrow
authorities by individual governments.3 7
A. European Community
The Commission of the European Communities voiced its
essentially negative opinion3 3 1 of key escrow in an August 1997
(stating that Arkadi Golubkov, chairman of Russian Security Council's Committee for
Computer Security, leads group of fifteen representatives of government departments
in formulating regulations to implement cryptographic key escrow mechanism in Rus-
sia).
333. See UK: Encryption: The Debate Continues . REUTER TEXTLINE COMPUTING,
June 5, 1997 (stating that "[a] public consultation paper, issued [in March of 1997 by
the British government], proposes that all those who want to keep digital data private
by encrypting it must first'make sure the government has free and easy access to the
software key which will scramble it."); see also British DTI Public Consultation Paper,
supra note 17 (setting forth key escrow proposal).
334. See generally White Paper, supra note 19 (proposing key escrow infrastructure
administered by key certification authorities).
335. See generally, British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17. The U.K.
proposal states that:
[11 egal access can be achieved by making use of a key escrow/recovery system.
Key recovery allows authorized persons (for example users, officers of an or-
ganization and law enforcement authorities) under certain conditions, to
decrypt messages with the help of cryptographic key information, held in es-
crow, and supplied by one or more trusted parties.' In such cases legal access is
to the private confidentiality key.
Id. 37.
336. See Brooks Tigner, EU Aims to Spur Encryption Trade by Lifting Limits, DEFENSE
NEWS, Oct. 13, 1997, at 94 (comparing EC and U.S. key escrow policy).
337. Id.
338. But see Froomkin, supra note 209, at 61 (stating that EU has proposed project
to establish European network of trusted third parties under control of member na-
tions that resembles UK proposal). On the subject of cooperation with the EU, the
British DTI Public Consultation Paper states that:
It is recognized that complementary European Commission initiatives on
Trusted Third Parties would be appropriate to enable an EU wide network of
TTPs to be established. The Government has therefore, been working closely
with the European Commission on the scope and content of applicable meas-
ures. The Government, in concert with other European countries, has recom-
1998]
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Communication33 in which it articulated Europe's future course
of action regarding digital signatures and encryption 3 40 Noting
the debate surrounding regulation of cryptography in France,
Great Britain, and the United States, the Commission presented
three arguments against enacting a key escrow infrastructure. 4 1
These include inevitable vulnerability,3 42 prohibitive Cost,3 4 3 and
questionable effectiveness.3 44 In conclusion, the Commission
stated that economic well-being of industry involved in the devel-
opment of electronic commerce takes precedence over any gov-
ernment-sponsored mandatory key escrow programs. 45
At the European Ministerial Conference 346 on July of 1997,
Ministers from the Member Sta'tes of the European Union noted
the great importance of encryption technology in protecting the
mended that the Commission adopt measures to demonstrate, trial and pilot
TTP projects which would underpin the EU wide development of encryption
services through TTPs
British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17, 21.
339. Communication on European Encryption Policy, supra note 23, COM (97)
503 Final.
340. Id. at 2. The stated purpose of the Communication on European Encryption
Policy includes:
[e] nsuring the functioning of the Internal Market for cryptographic products
and services as well as products ans services incorporating cryptographic tech-
niques, while respecting public security concerns and contributing to a ho-
mogenous security area in the EU ....
Id. The Commission also proposed to enact a common European framework on cryp-
tography in accordance with the objectives in the Communication by the year 2000. Id.
at iii.
341. Id. at 12-13.
342. See id. at 13 (stating that "[i]nevitably, any key access scheme introduces addi-
tional ways to break into a cryptographic system").
343. See id. (stating that "[tihe costs associated with key escrow can be very high
[and], up to now, questions on costs and who would bear them have not been ad-
dressed by policy makers").
344. See id. (stating that "[k]ey access schemes can be easily circumvented - even if,
hypothetically speaking, everyone would be forced to pass through these systems").
345. Id.
346. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORKS MINISTERIAL DECLARATION No. 20 (1997)
[hereinafter MINISTERIAL DECLARATION]. Participants at the Conference included Min-
isters of the Member States of the European Union, members of the European Free
Trade Association, members of the European Commission, officials from the United
States, Canada, Japan, Russia, and representatives from industry. Id. at 1. The MINISTE-
RiAL DECLARATION identifies the objective of the conference as "to broaden the com-
mon understanding of the use of Global Information Networks, to identify barriers to
their use, to discuss possible solutions and to undertake an open dialogue on further
possibilities for European and international co-operation." Id.
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fragile developing electronic commerce.347 The Ministers also
noted the OECD.4 guidelines as a basis of future cryptography
policy, and encouraged industry to lead the development of en-
cryption.34 9 The OECD Council Guidelines, published on
March 27, 1997, identify eight general principles for nations to
follow in order to successfully implement encryption and pro-
mote electronic commerce. 3 0 As part of the sixth principle, the
347. Id. The MINIsTERIAL DECLARATION notes that,
Ministers recognize that advances in Global Information Networks have the
potential to affect every aspect of our society - from commerce to health care,
from education to leisure, from the practice of government to the exercise of
democracy .... [T] hey note that the Internet is already starting to create new
businesses, new high-value services, and, most importantly, new jobs ....
Global Networks represent a powerful influence in the social, educational and
cultural fields - empowering educators, lowering barriers to entry for the crea-
tion and dissemination of content in different languages, offsetting the effect
of distance for more remote users and offering users access to ever richer
sources of information .... Equally importandy... Global Information Net-
works give practical reality to freedom of expression and access to informa-
tion.
Id. 2,4-5.
348. MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, supra note 346, 36. The OECD, an acronym for
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, is a coalition of nations
formed to promote their mutual economic growth and the general expansion of world
trade. OECD CHARTER art. 1. The OECD was created in 1.961 to replace the post-war
Marshall Plan's Organization for European Economic Cooperation ("OEEC"). OECD
Facing Identity Crisis, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEwswntE, May 18, 1997. Based in Paris, the
OECD is comprised of twenty nine member nations. Brian Love, OECD Adopts Commu-
nications Encryption Guidelines, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, March 27, 1997. See Stewart A.
Baker, Decoding OECD Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, 31 INT'L LAw. 729 (1997) (noting
that OECD Member Nations include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, It-
aly, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
349. MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, supra note 346, 1 37.
350. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Recommendation
of the Council Concerning Guidelines for Cryptographic Policy (March 27, 1997) (visited July
29, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/disti/iccp/cryptoe.html> (also on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The eight principles
articulated in the OECD Guidelines are:
1. Trust in cryptographic methods: Cryptographic methods should be trust-
worthy in order to generate confidence in the use of information and
communications systems.
2., Choice of cryptographic methods: Users should have a right to choose any
cryptographic method, subject to applicable law.
3. Market driven development of cryptographic methods: Cryptographic
methods should be developed in response to the needs, demands and re-
sponsibilities of individuals, businesses and governments.
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OECD urges that lawful access to cryptography should be devel-
oped in light of the other principles, which weigh heavily in
favor of privacy and market-driven development of encryption
technology. 51 Although the Guidelines are not binding on
OECD member nations,, they reflect the sentiments and likely
future policy of the European Community regarding encryption
and key escrow.3 52
B. France
Commentators have noted that France has the most'com-
prehensive framework of cryptography regulations in the
world.3 3  The French government is currently considering a
proposed regulation that authorizes the formation of key escrow
agents to store cryptographic keys.354 The regulation provides
that'escrow agents must disclose the keys to law enforcement au-
thorities as otherwise required by the French Criminal Proce-
dure Code.3 55 The regulation also relaxes export restrictions on
4. Standards for cryptographic methods: Technical standards, criteria and
protocols for cryptographic methods should be developed and promul-
gated at the national and international level.
5. Protection of privacy and personal data: The fundamental rights of indi-
viduals to privacy, including secrecy of communications and protection of
personal data, should be respected in national cryptography policies and
in the implementation and use of cryptographic methods.
6. Lawful Access: National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to
plaintext, or cryptographic keys, of encrypted data. These policies must
respect the other principles contained in the guidelines to the greatest
extent possible.
7. Liability: Whether established by contract or legislation, the liability of in-
dividuals and entities. that offer cryptographic services or hold or access
cryptographic keys should be clearly stated.
8. International cooperation: Governments should cooperate to coordinate
cryptography policies. As part of this effort, governments should remove,
or avoid creating in the name of cryptography policy, unjustified obstacles
to trade.
Id.
351. Id.
352. Love, supra note 348.
353. See id. at 11-12 (stressing singular nature of French cryptography regulation,
only one currently enacted in Europe); but see Froomkin, supra note 209, at 60 (noting
that, although France has possibly most comprehensive cryptography laws in world,
they are generally not enforced).
354. See French Key Escrow Regulation, supra note 18, art. 17, § 2 (providing for
creation of bodies for managing keys pertaining to encryption devices).
355. Id. art. 17, § 2 (setting forth procedure for disclosing keys to legal authorities
under chapters I and II of book I of French Criminal Procedure Code).
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escrowed encryption. 56
C. Great Britain
In June of 1996, Ian Taylor, Britain's Minister for Science
and Technology, announced an upcoming Consultation Paper
on the British Government's proposals for regulation of crypto-
graphic keys. 57 The Consultation Paper, entitled Licensing of
Trusted Third Parties for the Provision of Encryption Services,
was issued by the British Department of Trade and Industry
("DTI") in March of 1997.58 The DTI introduces the proposal
by stressing that, as the need to secure electronic commerce cre-
ates greater need for cryptography, the more widespread use of
cryptography itself will create new dangers for law enforcement
by allowing criminals to obfuscate their illegal activities."' Be-
cause of this, the Consultation Paper states that government
must have access to appropriate mechanisms to decrypt suspect
860transmissions.
The Consultation Paper outlines a plan for the provision of
a network of trusted third parties 61 ("TTPs") which would serve
as the government's storehouses of private keys to be released
pursuant to a warrant. 36 2 Noting the international scope of elec-
tronic commerce, the Consultation Paper stresses that the TTP
network should extend across national borders.363 Allowing for
licensing of domestic issuers of cryptography with foreign TTPs,
it also underscores the need to establish similar standards in all
nations supporting the TTP network. 64
356. Id. art. 17, § 1(b); see Froomkin, supra note 209, at 60 (discussing French
government plan to relax export controls in return for compliance with escrow laws).
357. British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17 (introductory comments
of Ian Taylor).
358. Id.
359. See id. 36 (stating that "[a] critical issue presented by cryptography is the
possible conflict between privacy and law enforcement").
360. See id. 38 (adding that securing law enforcement interests through key es-
crow would permit government to relax current export controls on strong cryptogra-
phy).
361. See Froomkin, supra note 203, at 55 (describing function of trusted third par-
ties as storing cryptographic keys and certifying identity of key users).
.. 362. British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17, 46. The Consultation
Paper's mandatory key escrow provisions exclude organizations providing encryption
services to their employees for intra-company use only and encryption used as part of
another service such as encoding digital cable transmissions. Id. 9 48-49.
363. Id. 18.
364. Id. 21. In support of its proposal for an international TTP network, the DTI
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In addition to serving as key escrow agents, TTPs would also
provide necessary services such as authentication of digital signa-
tures and recovery of lost or corrupted keys, thus facilitating
electronic trade in general. 5 Although the Consultation Paper
mandates that all providers of encryption technology must ob-
tain a license, subscribers to such services need not use TTPs.3 6 6
Thus, whereas market forces would drive the assimilation of
TTPs into electronic commerce, government would have access
to encryption regardless of their acceptance.367 Among the gen-
eral benefits of TTPs, the Consultation Paper lists greater protec-
tion of the consumer, more widespread access to encryption
technology, secure electronic trading, and easier data recov-
ery. 6 8 Opponents of the Consultation Paper point out, how-
ever, that keys stored by TTPs are vulnerable to theft and use by
the British government for industrial espionage. 69 Others at-
tack it by noting that unescrowed black market cryptography will
emasculate the government's ability to decrypt transmissions
with escrowed keys.37°
D. United States
In 1994, the National Security Agency published the Es-
crowed Encryption Standard 371 ("EES") hoping to establish the
Public Consultation Paper cites the OECD Cryptography Guidelines, which stressed the
need for international cooperation in formulating uniform standards for encryption.
Id. 23.
365. Id. 39.
366. Id. 45.
367. See id. at annex F (stating that "[t] he market will decide if it wants to use TTP
services [and those] wishing to do otherwise will be at liberty to do so.").
368. Id. 42.
369. See UK: Encryption-The Debate Continues, REUTER TEXTLINE, COMPUTING, June 5,
1997, at 25 (discussing opposition to British DTI Public Consultation Paper).
370. Id. Cf British DTI Public Consultation Paper, supra note 17, Annex F
(stressing that despite criminal's ability to circumvent key escrow through unlicensed
encryption technology, government can at minimum access electronic transmissions to
the extent that licensed TTP services are used by public).
371. Cf Amy Fleischman, Personal Data Security: Divergent Standards in the European
Union and the United States, 19 FoRDIaAm INT'L L.J. 143, 177 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
U.S. Government's continued ability to eavesdrop on data communication encrypted
with the [escrowed encryption standard] will render this encryption system incompati-
ble with [Article 17 of European Parliament's Directive 95/46/EC, and] EU member
states .. .will continue to prohibit data communications encrypted with key escrow
technology from entering their jurisdictions."). The European Parliament Directive
95/46/EC which prohibits member states to transmit individuals' personal data to
countries having relaxed data protection laws, may be interpreted as standing opposed
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U.S. government's authority to access encrypted transmis-
sions.372 The standard created what became known as the
Skipjack, a classified algorithm using an eighty bit symmetric
key.373 The U.S. government incorporated this standard into the
Clipper 314 chip, which enabled users to encrypt telephone con-
versations, and the Capstone Fortezza PCMCIA card, used for e-
mail and computer file encryption.37 5 The Clipper and Cap-
stone chips were made available for purchase by the public.3 6
The U.S. government, however, retained copies of the crypto-
graphic keys to each manufactured chip, allowing it to intercept
and decrypt any message sent using the Skipjack technology.7 7
Although the Capstone chip gained some popularity, 8 the
Clipper chip was vehemently rejected by the public.3 9 In re-
sponse, the Clinton administration launched a second proposal
called Clipper 11.380 The new proposal allowed an exception to
to key escrow. See Parliament and Council Directive No. 95/46, art 25, O.J. L 281/31,
at 45 (1995) (prohibiting Member States from transferring personal data to countries
not having adequate levels of protection for such data). However, the Directive does
not apply to laws enacted to prevent financial crime. See Group of Ten Report on Elec-
tronic Money, supra note 4, at n.10 (stating that "[Directive 95/46/EC] is not applica-
ble to national legislation aimed at preventing, investigating and prosecuting criminal
activity affecting the payment system."). Furthermore, the European Council expressly
recognized the primacy of law enforcement interests over personal privacy in its Resolu-
tion on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications. Council Resolution of 17 Jan-
uary 1995, O.J. C 329/1, at 1 (1995) (noting that Resolution requirements for lawful
interception of telecommunications constitute important conditions for effective law
enforcement in modem telecommunications systems).
372. Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185, Es-
crowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5,997 (Feb. 9, 1994).
373. See Froomkin, supra note 209, at 23-24 (explaining policy behind Skipjack and
its operation).
374. Id. at 23. The name "Clipper" refers to the encryption system set forth in the
EES. Id. See also Froomkin, supra note 29, at 502 (stating that "[t]he government's
right to access the information in this 'Clipperized cash' could be hedged with proce-
dural safeguards, or it could be triggered automatically whenever a Clipperized digital
cash transaction exceeded current reporting limits.").
375. Froomkin, supra note 209, at 24.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See id. at 32 (stating that "Capstone ... has had at least some success, albeit
not enough to achieve the FBI's goal of ensuring that cryptography imposes no obsta-
cles to law enforcement's legal efforts to acquire the content of electronic communica-
tions and stored data.").
379. See Robyn Blumner, Under Clinton, Government Is All Ears, COMM. APPEAL, Aug.
11, 1996, at B5 (arguing that Clipper proposal needlessly invades users' privacy).
380. Field, supra note 55, at 993.
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export restrictions 381 on cryptographic algorithms and keys of
up to sixty-four bits provided that the keys were deposited with a
government-approved escrow mechanism.382 Clipper II met sig-
nificant opposition from U.S. hardware and software manufac-
turers who claimed that the lack of similar export controls in
other nations needlessly impaired sales overseas.383 In May of
1996, the Clinton administration proposed Clipper III in a gov-
ernment White Paper entitled Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Se-
curity, and Public Safety in the Global Information Infrastruc-
ture.384 In the White Paper, the Clinton Administration pro-
posed the creation of a worldwide Key Management
Infrastructure ("KMI"), eliminating the need for export con-
trols.38 In a public statement on October 1, 1996, Vice Presi-
381. See Kerben, supra note 15, at 130 (noting that, until October 1, 1996, U.S.
government considered, cryptography munition under Arms Control Export Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2778 subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), 22 C.F.R.
§ 120). Under the ITAR, the Department of State must grant permission allowing ex-
port of software encryption products with keys longer than 40 bits. 22 C.F.R. § 120. On
October 1, 1996, President Clinton signed executive order 13026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767,
which vested the Commerce Department with authority to regulate cryptography.
Kerben, supra note 15, at 130. The Commerce Department's Export Administration
Regulations define cryptography as dual-use technology, having both commercial and
military applications. 15 C.F.R. § 772; Kerben, supra note 15, at 131.
382. See Dorothy E. Denning, William E. Baugh, Jr., Symposium: Recent Developments:
Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technologies, 41 VILL. L. REv. 289, 291 (discussing Clip-
per II proposal).
383. See Froomkin, supra note 209, at 41 (stating that businesses wishing to export
products involving cryptographic technology "did not think the [export control] rules
would allow them to export a commercially viable product."); see also Kerben, supra
note 15, at 134 (stating that one could have purchased U.S. export-restricted encryp-
tion program in Russia for about five dollars); id.- (noting that despite U.S. export
controls, individuals around world could have downloaded encryption programs from
Internet which could not be exported from United States under existing regulations).
384. White Paper, supra note 19.
385. Id. The White Paper sets forth the following principles:
* Participation in the KMI will be voluntary. Key escrow in the KMI will occur
naturally through mutually trusted authorities;
• There will be a transition period during which legacy equipments which do
not support key recovery can be used to communicate with users in emerg-
ing full featured KMIs. (Government, industry, and users will need to ad-
dress the legitimate needs of those currently using non-key recovery prod-
ucts to communicate with users of the full-featured KMI in a manner that
protects legitimate government and public safety concerns. This will pro-
vide a transition path.);
* Products that operate with an escrowed KMI need to be developed with the
industry taking the lead;
* Industry can continue to lead in establishing standards for public key certifi-
cates, encryption algorithms, protocols, data recovery, and security services;
ENCRYPTED DIGITAL CASH TRANSFERS
dent Al Gore presented Clipper IV, allowing the export of cryp-
tography using up to fifty-six bit keys for two years provided that
industry cooperates by incorporating key recovery features into
future products.3 8
6
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD ALIGN ITS
EFFORT WITH GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED
STATES TO DEVELOP A JOINT NETWORK OF KEY ESCROW
AGENCIES IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE USE OF DIGITAL
PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR MONEY LAUNDERING PURPOSES
The European Commission wrongly rejects key escrow as
unworkable and harmful to electronic commerce. 38 7 By giving
law enforcement authorities access to encrypted electronic trans-
missions, key escrow authorities represent the primary tool for
detecting and eliminating digital money laundering. 8 Nations
should not stand idly by while criminals find ways to hide illicit
funds with encryption. 389 Unless regulated, cryptography will al-
low money launderers to obfuscate the complicated trail of digi-
tal transfers conducted to associate money with legitimate
sources. 
390
A. Traditional Money Laundering Control Measures Will Fail to
Prevent Electronic Money Laundering.
Existing laws enacted to prevent money laundering do not
consider the implications of digital money and thus will fail to
" Self-escrow will be permitted under specific circumstances; and
" Export controls on Key Escrow products will be relaxed progressively as the
infrastructure matures.
Id.
386. See Gore Speech, supra note 19 (stating that "under this initiative, the export
of fifty-six bit key length encryption products will be permitted under a general license
after one-time review and contingent upon industry commitment to build and market
future products that support key recovery.").
387. See supra notes 338-52 and accompanying text (discussing European Commu-
nity's opposition to government-sponsored key escrow).
388. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of key es-
crow in preventing crime and facilitating electronic commerce).
389. See supra notes 321-30 and accompanying text (discussing adaptability of digi-
tal payment systems for money laundering purposes).
390. See supra notes 215-29 and accompanying text (discussing importance of cryp-
tography in digital payment systems); see also supra notes 230-45 and accompanying text
(explaining difficulty of cracking cryptographic code).
19981
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prevent money laundering through digital payment systems. 91
Traditional money laundering laws focus on financial institu-
tions which often serve as conduits for transferring illicit funds
to legitimate businesses and accounts. 392 Once apportioned into
smaller amounts and, distributed among non-criminal sources,
the money is easily funneled back into the criminals' hands.393
To prevent this, laws such as the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act require
financial institutions to document large transactions and report
any suspicious activity. 9 4 Like many similar money laundering
laws, the Bank Secrecy Act requires institutions to create a paper
trail behind money transfers that law enforcement authorities
can trace in the course of an investigation.395 International
agreements for combating money laundering also rely on finan-
cial institutions.396 Such agreements typically require nations to
provide foreign investigators with access to paper trails main-
tained by their domestic financial institutions.397
By enabling individuals to transfer money without using fi-
nancial institutions, digital payment systems eliminate the effec-
tiveness of laws that establish paper trails. 98 Money transferred
from a bank account onto an SVC at an ATM or through an
electronic wallet connected to a personal computer can be trans-
ferred anywhere in the world without a single reporting require-
ment.399 This capability will allow money launderers to conduct
391. See supra notes 275-320 and accompanying text (setting forth domestic and
international initiatives that rely primarily on financial institutions to uncover evidence
of money laundering).
392. Id. See also supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text (describing placement
and layering stages of money laundering where money is transferred between legitimate
concerns to hide its source).
393. See, e.g., supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing how BCCI helped
money launderers reintegrate laundered money through legitimate transactions).
394. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (discussing BSA provisions re-
quiring individuals and financial institutions to report money transfers).
395. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (discussing currency transaction
report mandated by BSA which served as paper trail facilitating investigations).
396. See supra notes 275-98 and accompanying text (discussing international initia-
tives for combating money laundering).
397. See, e.g., supra note 295 (setting forth provisions of Council Directive 91/308
requiring that Member States "shall ensure that credit and financial institutions ...
[e]stablish adequate procedures of internal control and communication in order to
forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering.").
398. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (describing operation of elec-
tronic wallets which enable individuals to transfer money without using regulated finan-
cial institutions).
399. Id.
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countless amounts of transfers for purposes of layering illicit
funds.4 00 Although law enforcement authorities can intercept
these electronic transmissions, cryptography prevents them from
deciphering their content.40 1 Controlling digital money laun-
dering therefore translates into having access to encrypted com-
munications. 0 2
B. In Order to Effectively Police Digital Payment Systems, Law
Enforcement Authorities Must Have Access to Cryptographic Keys
Cryptography presents an insurmountable barrier to tracing
suspect electronic transmissions.40 3 Without access to the con-
tent of ciphertext,40 4 law enforcement authorities cannot deter-
mine the transmission's origin, destination, or whether it in-
cludes digital money.40 5 Access to encrypted data depends on
finding the correct decryption key.406 This, however, may take
years for even the most powerful computers.4°0 In order to effec-
tively trace illicit funds structured in the money laundering pro-
cess within sufficient time to convict the responsible parties, law
enforcement authorities should have the capability to decrypt
electronic transmissions. 40 8 Governments can secure this capa-
bility by establishing escrow agencies to hold copies of active
cryptographic keys.409 An international network of key escrow
agencies would provide investigators with a quick and easy mech-
400. See supra note 4 (noting commentators' warning regarding adaptability of dig-
ital payment systems for money laundering purposes).
401. See supra notes 230-45 and accompanying text (describing difficulty in finding
symmetric and asymmetric keys).
402. See supra note 35 (noting legal authorities' concern about difficulty of polic-
ing encrypted communications).
403. See supra notes 230-46 and accompanying text (describing arduous process of
cracking cryptographic codes).
404. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text (explaining formation of sym-
metric ciphertext).
405. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing barriers to effective
law enforcement caused by use of cryptography to encode electronic transmissions).
406. See, e.g., supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text (discussing methods of
finding symmetric and asymmetric keys); see also supra notes 215-29 and accompanying
text (describing the role of cryptography in mechanics of digital money).
407. See Kerben, supra note 15, at 129 (noting recent study finding that, in order
to crack 1024 bit key, one would need one hundred million computers with eight
Megabytes of RAM operating at 100 MHZ for 280,000 years).
408. See supra note 330 (noting experts' opinion that cryptography will complicate
tracing laundered money).
409. See supra notes 246-56 and accompanying text (discussing operation of key
escrow agents).
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anism to investigate suspect transmissions, 410 and thus effectively
eliminate the conscription of digital payment systems for money
laundering purposes.
C. The European Commission's Reasons for Opposing the Creation of
Key Escrow Agencies Lack Factual Support
In its August 1997 Communication, the European Commis-
sion opposed vesting governments with the authority to aggres-
sively develop key escrow networks. 411  First, the Commission
claimed that any key escrow system would inevitably fall prey to
computer-literate criminals.4 12 Although this may likely happen
on a small scale, legal authorities in the United States and Great
Britain have pointed out that taking no precautionary measures
against the potential criminal use of encryption will create insuf-
ferable future problems.4"' If governments act too late in estab-
lishing safeguards, the technological tide may uncover even
greater barriers to prosecuting money launderers. Although to-
day's computers, for example, can decode encrypted transmis-
sions, the development of longer cryptographic keys may soon
eliminate this capability.414
The Commission also proposed that the cost of establishing
key escrow, both in terms of monetary expenditure and restraint
on electronic commerce, renders it improper for achieving its
purported aim.41 5 This argument fails to consider that key es-
crow presents significant economic benefits. For example, as
410. See, e.g., supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text (noting necessity of key
escrow agencies to law enforcement stressed by British DTI Public Consultation Paper).
411. See supra notes 33845 and accompanying text (noting Commission's argu-
ment that implementation of key escrow would suffer from inevitable vulnerability, pro
hibitive cost, and low effectiveness).
412. See supra note 342 (citing Commission statement that "[i]nevitably, any key
access scheme introduces additional ways to break into a cryptographic system.").
413. See supra notes 359-60 and accompanying text (noting British Government's
concern about unregulated proliferation of cryptography); CRISIS REPORT, supra note
5, at 170 (warning that failure to implement key escrow may result in "proliferation of
products with encryption capabilities that would seriously weaken, if not wholly negate,
the authority to wiretap... and damage intelligence collection for national security and
foreign policy reasons.").
414. See supra note 238 (noting possible development of cryptographic keys of suf-
ficient length to place technological requirements for breaking code outside limits of
physical science).
415. See supra note 343 (citing Commission's statement that "[t] he costs associated
with key escrow can be very high [and], up to now, questions on costs and who would
bear them have not been addressed by policy makers.").
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pointed out by the U.S. Clipper II, III, and IV proposals, key
escrow will facilitate the general oversight of encrypted data and
thus eliminate the need for export controls on escrowed encryp-
tion."' This, in turn, would drive the market for strong cryptog-
raphy and ultimately result in safer and thus more robust elec-
tronic commerce. In addition, the British DTI Public Consulta-
tion Paper proposes using key escrow agencies as providers of
consumer services such as recovery of lost keys and authentica-
tion of digital signatures.4"' Such services are indispensable to
electronic commerce,418 and would generate substantial fees
that could be used to maintain the key escrow infrastructure.
D. Proposal
The proper means of implementing an international key es-
crow network should include both aggressive legislation and eco-
nomic incentives for the participants. The Commission incor-
rectly concludes that the market should play the primary role in
developing key escrow agencies. The market, in fact, has proven
that the lucrative practice of money laundering attracts many le-
gitimate businesses. 41 9 Governments, therefore, should pursue
legal access to encrypted data despite opposition from industry.
By establishing key escrow agencies that can also authenticate
digital signatures and re-issue lost keys, governments will reap
support from the expanding market for services supporting elec-
tronic commerce.420
Most importantly, key escrow must be the product of inter-
national cooperation. Current multilateral agreements echo the
widespread realization that money laundering can only be
fought effectively if criminals have relatively few safe harbors to
416. See supra notes 380-86 and accompanying text (discussing Clipper II, III, and
IV policy of permitting export of cryptography in exchange for industry cooperation in
creation of key escrow infrastructure); see also note 383 and accompanying text (noting
dissatisfaction of U.S. computer industry resulting from export controls on cryptogra-
phy which adversely impacted overseas sales).
417. See supra notes 365-70 and accompanying text (setting forth suggestions of
British DTI Public Consultation Paper to employ key escrow agencies as providers of
various consumer services).
418. See, e.g., supra notes 203-14 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of
digital signatures and their role in electronic commerce).
419. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (describing money laundering
process).
420. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing need for certifica-
tion authorities for proper implementation of digital signatures).
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hide illicit funds.4 21  For example, Council Directive 91/308
notes that measures enacted to prevent money laundering will
fail without international cooperation.4 22 In addition, the Coun-
cil of Europe Convention stresses the need for nations to mini-
mize the adverse impact of bank secrecy laws on the detection of
laundered money.423 As these agreements suggest, divergent key
escrow standards will allow money launderers to simply shift op-
erations to countries with relaxed cryptography regulations. Fu-
ture efforts to prevent money laundering should build upon in-
ternational cooperation which has proven effective in past initia-
tives.
CONCLUSION
Digital money represents the future of commerce and bank-
ing. Along with its many benefits, however, it brings daunting
concerns for law enforcement authorities. By allowing individu-
als to transfer money quickly and anonymously without trigger-
ing any reporting requirements, digital payment systems provide
the ideal mechanism for laundering money. Key escrow agen-
cies can provide a necessary solution to this impending problem
by furnishing law enforcement authorities with cryptographic
keys to decode suspicious electronic transmissions within suffi-
cient time to detect and convict money launderers.
421. See generally supra notes 275-98 and accompanying text (discussing multilateral
initiatives calling for nations' cooperation in combating money laundering).
422. See supra notes 288-95 and accompanying text (discussing purpose and provi-
sions of Council Directive 91/308).
423. See supra note 287 (citing Article 4 of Council of Europe Convention mandat-
ing that "[e]ach party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be neces-
sary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial
or commercial records be made available to be seized in order to carry out [law en-
forcement].").
